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From Chairman’s Desk
India is blessed with a strong base of producers, 
consumers, entrepreneurs and institutions, each of which 
build on each other to generate growth and prosperity. 
Recently, macro-economic events have impacted and 
could potentially impact growth in the short to medium 
term. However, we continue to have all the ingredients in 
place to deliver sustained long term growth, growth which 
would bring millions out of deprivation
Investments will have a key role to play in this 
transformation, in efficiently channelizing capital to 
businesses best placed to take advantage and drive this 
growth. It is encouraging to note that policy makers have 
taken a series of steps to restore the credibility of India’s 
growth story. We look forward to the resurgence of our 
economic growth and the consequent recovery of investor 
interest in the Indian markets. 
I am fully confident that with the continuous support and 
co-ordination India shall be able to gear up for heights of 
achievements. Thanks to the serious researchers, who 
have rendered timely valuable advice and guidance. I 
express my appreciation for efforts of IJBIT editorial team 
to bring the contributions of researchers in the hand of 
decision makers. Nonetheless, the contributors are a 
continued source of inspiration and strength at all times 
to the IJBIT team. 
Dr. P. V. Ramana
Chairman - ITM Trust
Organizations across the globe have been addressing the 
issue of gender disparity in the workplace in the past couple 
of decades. On the one hand, we have seen substantial 
progress. It was recently reported that women now comprise 
of 40% of the global workforce. They have also been gaining 
strides in higher education. There are more women teachers 
and students in the halls of the higher education institutions 
than ever. More and more women are enrolling for and 
earning professional degrees. Companies too have recognized 
the importance of gender balance and therefore taken and 
implemented decisions to address the gender skewness in 
their workforce.
But all is not rosy as it appears. In even the most advances 
countries research has indicated that corporate women 
are lagging behind men in all stages of their career. This is 
most obvious in the fact that women have not penetrated 
into the upper echelons of management in large numbers. 
Most women perceive the glass ceiling as very much around 
and not shattered as all hoped it would be! After decades of 
aggressive efforts to create opportunities for women, it is sad 
that inequity remains entrenched. This indicates that these 
iniquities are a result of pervasive social outlook and not 
isolated to the working environment. Wholesome changes 
are needed in improving attitude to women in general. 
Research has a responsibility to be an agent of change. While 
many studies have looked into this issue from many angles, it 
is urged that a more fulsome approach address this and other 
social issues that plague our nation.
Prof. Vinod Sople, PhD
Chief Editor
From Editor’s Desk
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ABSTRACT
The ongoing global financial crisis has become prominently visible since September  2008.  This  crisis  affected  the  whole 
world  and  enhanced  the importance of policy implementation to mitigate financial crises in future. Many academics 
blamed insufficient domestic regulation as the reason of crises, others pointed to the lack of overseas financial regulation 
and inappropriate actions by international organizations, such as the IMF and World Bank. This whole discussion 
encouraged a look back and analyzes of a previous crisis in a small country such as Russia. This paper evidently shows 
the inefficiency of IMF policy during the Russia Crisis in 1998 by implementing a new monetary balance- of-payment 
model in Russian data. This model identified the role of macroeconomic fundamentals and international economic policy 
implications on the likelihood and the timing of the currency crisis in Russia. For the period from December 1995 to 
December 1998 it was found that, the increase in domestic credit growth gradually undermined confidence in the fixed 
exchange rate regime. The most dangerous point was at the end of 1998, when the collapse probability was above 90 
percent. This result called to doubt the IMF’s July packet 1998 and revealed the political aspects of this financial help.
KEYWORDS: Currency Crisis, Financial Liberalization, Sudden Stops, Monetary Balance-Of-Payment Model, Russian 
Crisis, IMF’s Policy.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: G01, G29, N14, F33
Evaluating IMF Intervention Ten Years after the Russian Crisis: 
Modelling the Impact of Macroeconomic Fundamentals and Economic Policy
Malgorzata Sulimierska1 
1Malgorzata Sulimierska, Economics Department, University of Sussex, England, UK and LICOS, Centre of Transition Economics, Economics Department, 
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1. INTRODuCTION
The  ongoing  global  financial  crisis  affected  the  whole 
world.  The failure, of several large United States-based 
financial firms caused intensive discussion about the future of 
international financial supervision and position of International 
Monetary  Fund.    Since  1944  the  IMF  has  supported  many 
countries though loans, research advisors and economic 
programs. However, critics highlight various examples in which 
democratized countries fell economically after receiving IMF 
programs. For instance, Russia in 1998 was one of example 
of IMF intervention. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it 
was believed that Russia would soon be integrated into the 
global market. The two main international institutions such as 
the IMF and World Bank focused on Russia to implement the 
macroeconomic stability program. However, after six years of 
economic reform in Russia, privatisation and macroeconomic 
stabilisation had only limited success such as exchange rate 
stability in bands and low inflation rate. Especially the problem 
of high corruption intensified the problem and limited the 
possibility of reform success. On the other hand, in August 
1998, Russia was forced to default on its sovereign debt, 
devalue the Rouble, and suspend payments by commercial 
banks to foreign creditors. Under these circumstances, basic 
common sense suggested Russia could be heading for a 
fundamental macroeconomic crisis (the hypothesis of the 
existing so-called first generation model). However, the global 
financial markets reacted with shock and surprise at Russia’s 
default in August 1998 because it was widely believed that 
Russia was too politically important to default. In addition, 
through the 1990s, Russia had  operated  under  the  auspices 
and  close  scrutiny  of  a  Fund-supported program.  It  is 
natural  to  pose  the  question:    What  did  cause  the  Russian 
economy to face a currency crisis after so much had been 
accomplished and what was the impact of IMF intervention on 
Russian crisis?
It seems natural to analyse in this paper the reasons for the 
Russian crisis and explain the IMF’s impact on this crisis. In 
order to explain this, three aspects will need to be analysed. 
Firstly, how theoretical studies might explain the Russian 
currency crisis. Secondly, whether this crisis could have been 
predicted in theoretical terms or whether the crisis might have 
been inevitable, and lastly, but not least, how can the impact of 
difficult external intervention, especially by the IMF, on the crisis 
be understood? It is not possible to leave out of the account the 
impact of the IMF intervention on the Russian economy and 
investors’ expectations.
This paper is divided into four parts. The first part describes 
the theoretical basis of the currency crisis though various 
generations of models. Then the second part presents the 
empirical literature review, especially the analysis of a single 
country. In the last part, the Russian case is described in order 
to adopt the empirical econometric model, in which I modified 
CVW’s model  (a  monetary  balance–of-payments  model) 
(Cumby  and  Van Wijnbergen’s model). This modification 
answers the question of whether the crisis could have been 
predicted. The section discusses the role of the IMF in the 
Russian crisis.
2. ThEORETICAL mODELS OF CuRRENCY CRISES
The  theoretical  discussion  is  mainly  presented  by  three 
different currency crisis stories (Kamisky (2003), Sagib(2002) 
Sulimierska (2008 a,b)).
The first story was inspired by the Latin American currency 
crisis in the late 1960s and early 1970s- it is so-called “first 
generation models” (or “cannonical models”). These models 
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stress that crises are caused by unsustainable fiscal and 
monetary expansion that  cause  a  persistent loss  of  foreign 
reserves.  Since market agents start doubting the ability of 
the central bank to control the fixed exchange rates system. 
The reserves fall to a critical threshold, the rational agents 
initiate speculative attacks on the foreign exchange leading 
to the collapse of the exchange rate [(see Krugman (1979), 
Salant and Henderson (1978), Dornbush (1987) and Flood 
and Garber (1984), Flood, Garber and Kramer (1996)].
After the EMS crises of the early 1990s, the second story 
developed on the base of imprecise irrational behaviours of 
investors on financial markets (so-called “second generation 
models”). The European countries did not have any problem 
of divergence between fiscal policy and exchange rate policy; 
in this case a crisis can happen without a significant change in 
macroeconomics fundaments. Generally, there are two main 
lines among second generation models:   the self-fulfilling 
currency crisis models and the pure speculative models. The 
main difference between these two lines of models is that 
self- fulfilling models effects a crisis as a result of rational 
market respond to persistently conflicting internal and external 
macroeconomic targets. On the contrary, pure speculative 
models consider the crisis as the reflection of irrational private 
behaviour. The self-fulfilling models point that the core of 
the currency crisis is directly linked with the market agents’ 
formation of expectation about future exchange rate policy 
(mainly investors’ rumours). The government policy is a kind 
of trade-off between the benefits and costs of maintaining a 
credible exchange rate peg. Government faces two conflicting 
targets: reducing inflation and keeping economic activity. 
The peg exchange rates might allow achieving the first goal; 
however, there is possibility of the loss of competitiveness and 
a recession with sticky prices. On the other hand, devaluations 
of exchange rate might restore competitiveness and eliminate 
the unemployment. At the same time, the market agents 
create expectations about this future government policy and 
then start the actions that affect some variables (e.g. interest 
rate) and wait for economic policies to respond. In that case, 
the level of reserve will mainly depend on the degree of 
commitment of authorities to hold the peg. The weaker the 
commitment of the authorities the higher  the  probability  that 
the  speculative  attack  will  be  successful  (see Obstfeld 
(1986a,b, 1994) Ozkan and Sutherland (1995), Reisen (1998) 
and Krugman (1996)).
The pure speculation models have two interesting tales to 
be told. The first tale describes the speculation against the 
currency as the consequence of herding behaviour (Calvo and 
Mendoza (2000), Binkhchandani and Sharma(2000)). Then the 
second tale gives large attention to the contagion and sudden 
stops effects (Gerlach and Smets (1995), Eichenngreen, 
Rose, Wyplosz (1996), Masson (1998)).2 There are two 
different ways to present the herding behaviours. Firstly, full 
information assumption does not hold, agents have different 
pieces of information due to the cost of information. In order 
to reduce this cost, individuals start to base their behaviours 
on the behaviours of others (so-called leaders). This might 
move financial market to an ineffective distribution and 
then  to  a  crisis  outcome  (Calvo  and  Mendoza  (2000)). 
Secondly, the manager’s salary will not decrease so much if 
the other investors on the market make the same mistake. In 
that situation the cost of standing out against other portfolio 
managers’ crowd is larger than followed wrong along with 
everyone. (Binkhchandani and Sharma(2000)).
The last story about crisis, the so-called third generation 
model of currency crisis, has been developed rapidly soon 
after the Asian crisis. This crisis  could  not  be  explained  by 
previous  theoretical  models  and  moved attentions to micro 
fundamentals of an economy (see Krugman (1998, 1999 a,b) 
and Velasco (2001)). The third generation models consider 
three micro fundamentals of an economy as reasons of the 
currency crisis: -fragility  of  banking  system  (McKinnon  and 
Huw  Pill(1996),  Chang  and Velasco (1998 a, b, c), Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999)); -financial market inefficiency (moral 
hazard or the problem of asymmetrical information) (see Stoker 
(1994), Mishkin (1996) Krugman (1998)) -companies’ balance 
sheet and the effects of monetary policy (see Krugman (1999 
a,b), Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000,2001),Borenszten 
and Lee (2000), Coulibaly and Millar (2008))
The first issue addressed in the development of third generation 
models were the fragility of the banking system and financial 
market inefficiency. The discussion might be started at the 
modern variants of the first generation model, the so-called twin 
banking-currency crisis model (Glick and Hutchison (2001)). 
This framework stresses the fact that currency crises are often 
part of broader financial crises, where the two elements interact 
with one another, giving life to what have been called the 
“twin crises”.3 These models suggest that when central banks 
finance the bailout of troubled financial institutions by printing 
money and open the economy with exchange rate peg, there 
is the classic story of a currency crash prompted by excessive 
money creation (see Stoker (1994), Mishkin (1996)) Krugman 
(1998, 1999a,b), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)). After that, 
Chang and Velasco (1998 a, b, c) investigated more intensely 
the aspects of  the  financial fragility and  currency crisis. In 
opened  economy models, the banks play active role, not only 
as distributor of deposits, but also generating large capital 
inflows to the economy though borrowing money from aboard 
at a low interest rate and then reinvest in the domestic market. 
But at the same time it creates the risk of a sudden reversal 
of capital flows and international illiquidity4 of the domestic 
financial system. For instance, if depositors will attempt to 
withdraw funds in the short run and then foreign creditors will 
not roll over initial credit in the short run. In that case, the bank 
will not be able to honour all of its commitments.  The domestic 
banks do not have enough domestic deposits in liquid form. 
Long-term investments of the domestic bank will yield little 
if they have to be liquidated prematurely. The central bank 
plays the role of a lender of the resort in the opened economy 
with a fixed exchange rate. However, the stability of banking 
system is depended on the size of the central bank’s reserves 
and the exchange rate regime strength. On the other hand, 
to support domestic banks, the central bank might pursue an 
expansionary policy and keep interest rates from rising. But still, 
private agents use the additional domestic currency to deplete 
the central bank’s reserves. Therefore with limited international 
reserves, eventually, the central bank will abandon the peg. 
This shows how a financial crisis can transfer to a balance of 
payments crisis and caused boom-bust cycles. The further 
expansion of borrowing abroad by domestic banks creates 
the lending expansion and investing-consumption booms in 
the domestic economy. These booms might continue to widen 
the current account deficit and then financial markets will need 
more foreign capital to feed the trade deficit (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999:475). Moreover, the lending boom converge 
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levels gradually in inflation and then cumulative real  exchange 
rate appreciation (see Dornbusch (1976,1987)’s overshooting 
model ). Cumulative real exchange rate appreciation generates 
the expectation of exchange rate depreciation on the market. 
Change and Velasco’s model point out that the capital inflows 
become outflows and cause the collapse of the banking system 
causing currency crisis.5
Finally, the last branch of the third generation models 
concentred on a problem appears in balance sheet firms as 
the primary source of crises. Especially, Krugman (1999 a, b) 
and Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (1999, 2001) intensively 
investigated  this  topic  though  its  connection  to  other 
microeconomics aspects such as fragility of the banking 
system and asymmetrical  information  (moral  hazard).  In  the 
models,  the  crisis  might happen  under  different  exchange 
rate  regime.  The  entrepreneurs  obtained credits from two 
sources: domestic or foreign markets. It allowed them to 
mix short-term debt, denominated in domestic currency and 
long-term debt denominated in foreign currency. The credits 
amount to finance investment depends on firms’ wealth. And 
on the other hand, the firms’ wealth primarily determines 
investment and output (Bernanke and Gertler (1989). In the 
case of any economic shock, the sudden capital inflows cause 
an explosion in the domestic currency value of dollar debt and 
in this manner increased in foreign currency repayments and 
reduce their ability to borrow for further investments. Moreover 
the decline of investment and output implied a credit-constrain 
in economy. Further reduction of capital inflows decreases the 
demand for the domestic currency and leads to depreciation. 
Thus, the financial crisis cycles started to close circle (Aghion, 
Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001).
In the end, it is worth talking about Sudden –Stop Models (see 
Calvo (1998), Mendoza (2001), Mendoza and Smith (2002) 
and Hutchison and Noy
(2002), Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004), Valdes (2008)). 
These models analysed  a  phenomenon  of  abrupt  reduction 
of  the  capital  inflows  into  a country. Before the moment of 
abrupt reduction it has been receiving large volumes of foreign 
capital.  But they focused on micro and macro perspective so 
they are in the middle between second and third generation 
models.
3. OvERvIEW OF EmpIRICAL LITERATuRE
A large number of empirical studies have examined the 
determinants of  currency  crises, but the  empirical  evidence 
is  far  from  conclusive inference. In  general,  two  lines  of 
analysis  can  be  distinguished:  single- country or multi-country. 
The number of multi-countries has grown rapidly since the 
beginning of 1990s (see Sulimierska (2008b)). However, these 
multi- country analyses have some limitations due to attempt 
to exploit the higher variability  associated  with  cross-country 
information.  In  that  way,  the evidence from multi-country 
studies is mixed and not very robust contrast to single-country 
studies (Esquivel and Larrain (1998:9)). On the other hand, the 
most of single-country studies were developed before 1990s. 
However, after the Asian Crisis academic attention moved back 
to single country analysis by investigating  microeconomic 
fundaments  such  as  company’s  debts, performance of 
financial institutions (see Borenszten and Jong-Wha (2000)).
In this case it is sensible to follow the first line of empirical 
paper due to this paper will examine the IMF intervention in 
the context of the possibility that this crisis was caused by the 
inconsistency between the exchange rate policy and fiscal 
policy. The single-country analysis developed in the beginning 
of 1990s. This analysis focused on the determinants of crises 
in a single country during periods  of  economic  turbulence 
and  usually  tried  to  explain  the  timing  of devaluation 
in a specific country based on the behaviour of several 
macroeconomic indicators (the linear discrete time models). 
Most of them have generally found strong evidence suggesting 
that domestic macroeconomic indicators play a key role in 
determining currency crises. Nevertheless, these results 
might be suggestive, are sometimes limited since they are 
obtained from a small number of countries during very specific 
situations.6
However, both studies above provide evidence for qualitative 
success of applying first generation model (the linear discrete 
time models) although these results can be broadly discussed 
since the restrictive assumptions including the purchasing power 
parity (PPP), interest rate parity, and the unresponsiveness of 
the demand for real balance to currency substitution motives 
(see CVW (1989), Blanco and Garber (1986), Goldberg (1994). 
Both models state that domestic credit shocks are still expected 
to be the dominant force in triggering speculative attacks on 
currency.
In briefly summarizing the first generation empirical literature is 
necessary to start with the classic representation Blanco and 
Garber (1986) model. This model analysed the movement from 
one fixed exchange rate to another and computed the one-
period ahead collapse probability for the fixed Mexican peso 
exchange rate from 1973-1982. To obtain these results they 
produced the devaluation models and used the time-series 
estimates of the one- period -ahead probability of devaluation 
that allowed them to predict the timing, probability of speculative 
attacks and forecast lower bounds for the post-collapse 
exchange rates. Blanco and Garber’s model is a version 
of Krugman –Flood- Garber model. In this model, Blanko 
and Garber took the forward exchange rate as the shadow 
exchange, fixed exchange rate and calculation of the economic 
fundamental  from  the  bubble  model  and  to  construct  new 
regime  of  fixed exchange rate after currency crisis. The results 
of this paper showed that large exchange rate adjustments in 
Mexico were preceded by substantial increases in the  ex-ante 
probability  of  devaluation.  It  is  strong  evidence  of  the 
first generation views of currency crisis; however their model 
replicates some aspects of the relatively high values prior to 
actual devaluation. This causes some critics that exchange 
rate policy could not acknowledge an eventual devaluation, 
and then a crawling peg will be though be equivalent to a fixed 
exchange rate regime after speculative attack because (see 
Reynoso (2002b)).
A subsequent study along this line is CVW’s paper (1989). 
It is a similar model to Blanco and Garber’s (1986) model 
with crawling exchange regime. On the contrary to Blanco 
and Garber ‘s (1986), the domestic credit is not followed the 
stochastic process. Furthermore, the central bank does not 
know the critical level of international reserve at which the 
exchange rate regime will abandon before the speculative 
attacks. Because of this, authorise assumed the reserve floor 
was describe by a uniform distribution with an upper bound as 
the current level of reserves and the lower bound as minus the 
central bank’s gross foreign liabilities.   The final conclusion 
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from model is that the domestic credit growth strategy pursued 
by the Argentine government almost completely undermined 
the announced crawling peg exchange rate
Then, Goldberg’s analysis (1994) presents the devaluation 
model of Mexican peso for fixed or crawling exchange rate 
regime, but it has some deviation from these restricted 
assumptions of previous papers. The author calculated ex-
ante probability of currency crises. He attempted to predict the 
sizes of expected devaluation of Mexican peso for the period 
1980 and 1986 by generating the forecasts of lower bounds 
for sustainable post-collapse exchange  rates   between  the 
Mexican  peso   and   United   States  dollar.
 
Nevertheless there are some modifications compare with 
previous papers due to the author used the Goldberg (1991) 
version of Flood and Garber’s model (1984) as the base 
of estimation model (1995). As before the domestic credit 
creation and domestic spending excess are viewed as the 
primary reasons for reserve depletion. If, in any period, 
expansion of domestic credit is too large to be absorbed by 
the demand for real balance, equilibrium in the money market 
is achieved in tow way. The first way is though adjustment of 
the exchange rate in a flexible exchange rate system. The way 
is by offsetting movements in central bank foreign exchange 
reserve stocks in controlled exchange rate system. In order 
that the discrete -time collapsing exchange rate model relies 
in a money market equilibrium condition which determines 
either the equilibrium exchange rate under a flexible exchange 
rate system or the endogenous path of central bank reserve 
under a controlled exchange rate system. In accordance 
with the paper’s results domestic fiscal and monetary shocks 
were the main forces contributing to  speculative attacks 
on  the Mexican peso. Furthermore, the result suggested 
that the external credit shocks played a relatively minor role 
in the onset of Mexico’s currency crises during the 1980s. 
Moreover, a reduction of domestic credit growth increases 
the uncertainty surrounding this growth. Then, there will be 
reduction of the size and perhaps increase the frequency of 
currency realignments which might have greatly reduced the 
amount of currency speculation against the peso between 
1980 and 1986.
Another paper is similar line such as Blanco, Garber (1986) 
and Goldberg (1994), is Pazarbaşioğlu and Ötker’s (1997). 
This paper examines the potential currency crisis in  Mexico’s 
exchange rate regime during October 1982- December 
1994. Goldberg (1991, 1994)’s speculative attack models 
was implemented with a stochastic version of the monetary 
approach to exchange rate determination. In this model, 
the government and monetary authority are committed to 
maintaining the exchange rate within some form of crawling 
exchange rate regime in of a small open country. This 
model estimates the probability of devaluation to capture the 
systematic relationship between the realised regime changes 
and economic fundamentals. This probability evaluates 
whether  speculative  pressures  on  the  currency  can 
be  accounted  for  by economic fundamentals. Formally, 
the one-step-ahead probability of a regime change can be 
approximated by computing the probability that the floating 
exchange rate next period will exceed the prevailing fixed 
exchange rate. In order to distinguish the determinants of 
the likelihood of a currency crisis or the timing of crisis they 
used the survival model. In accordance with the empirical 
findings the probability associated with all regime changes in 
the sample period can be attributed to speculative pressures 
in light of some deterioration in economic fundamentals. In 
addition these results suggested that the decline in foreign 
reserves, the increase in the share of short-term foreign 
currency- indexed debt, and /or expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policies seem to be the main factors which determined 
the timing of speculative attacks Pazarbaşioğlu and Ötker 
(1997:841-845).
In summary, most of the studies used monthly data, except 
for Blanco, Garber’s (1986). Additionally finding results 
from these models led to unequivocal conclusion-domestic 
macroeconomic indicators play a key role in determining 
currency crises especially the  fiscal deficit and  inconsistency 
with exchange rate policy.
 
4. EmpIRICAL pART: ThE RuSSIA ECONOmETRIC mODEL
4.1. The Russian Case study
This section provides a brief review of the Russia economic 
and political situation in the late 1990s (Appendix A Table 1) 
that prompts some of the questions addressed in the theoretical 
model in the next section.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 held the promise of 
a peaceful and affluent Russia. It was believed that Russia 
would rapidly become integrated into  the  global  market  place 
and  never  again  be  a  threat  to  world  peace. However, the 
transition from communism to a market economy, which began 
in the early 1990s, was more complex than merely an economic 
experiment; it also involved the transformation of society and 
of social and political structures. As a consequence, Russia’s 
transformation challenged IMF and World Bank policies and 
planning.   In order to avoid a return to the communist system, 
these institutions advocated a shock therapy. This therapy had 
three main pillars: liberalisation, stabilisation and privatisation 
Shleifer and Treisman (2000:100-
132). The liberalisation program was intended to allow 
integration with a market economy so most prices were freed 
overnight in 1992, setting in motion hyperinflation, and creating 
the problem of macroeconomic instability. In addition, at this 
time Gregory Matushin, the President of the central bank of 
Russia, explained that inflation was rising because demand 
exceeded supply: firms were unable to produce, because 
they did not have sufficient working capital.  The central bank 
considered that its role was to fill the gap left by the central 
planning bureau, to provide firms with cash (”supply-sider” 
support for firms through virtually unlimited cash injections). 
The second rounds of reforms were stabilisation programs to 
build market institutions and bring inflation down.
 
However, this was  a  period of significant political instability. 
Government offices were taken over by the young reformers, 
medium-level Communist Party members who were promoted 
to high level government positions, but who knew little about 
politics and economics Ivanova and Wyplosz (2000:15-16). 
They were unable to create new democratic and economic 
institutions within the framework of the old communist and 
corrupt Russian environment. The last pillar was massive 
privatisation to create a new capitalist class to protect the new
democratic capitalist structure, but, instead, it created an 
oligarchy.7  Within a year of its rebirth, Russia was in complete 
disarray. Inflation was out of control, the federal budget was 
quickly contracting, damaging basic public services. The 
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standard of living sharply declined, and Mafia of all sorts had 
established themselves. The threat of the return of communism 
increased due to Yeltsin’s waning popularity and the rebuilding 
of the communist party in a new form under Genna (Ivanova 
and Wyplosz (2000:16).) To an extent, all these negative 
economic and political events culminated in the currency 
crisis of ’’Black Tuesday’’, on 11th October 1994. However, the 
collapse of the economy allowed the start of a new program 
of mass privatisation and a successful disinflation program 
partly based on anchoring the rouble to the dollar though a 
crawling peg arrangement, the corridor. In July 1995, this 
disinflation program was adopted by tightening monetary 
policy by giving autonomy to the Central Bank of Russia 
(Sutale (1999:7), Małecki, Sławiński, Piasecki and ? uławska 
(2001:137-153)). In addition, after Yeltsin’s re-election in 
1996, international optimism increased. In April 1996, Russian 
officials began negotiations to reschedule the repayment of 
the foreign debt inherited from the former Soviet Union as 
members of the Paris and  London Clubs of indebted nations 
and international institutions became obligated to expand 
their assistance.8 Clearly, the outlook in 1997 presented 
good reasons for optimism. Russian politics had managed to 
establish most of the pre-conditions for a successful transition, 
but they had failed in some important details due to impossible 
political conditions. Mass privatisation is usually  presented 
as  an  unmitigated  disaster.9  However,  there  were  many 
positive signals. Inflation was no longer a debilitating factor. 
The inflation rate for 1997 stood at 11 percentages, down 
from 2500 percentage in 1992. Monetary policy was entirely 
dedicated to the pursuit of disinflation, aiming at a rate of 5 
percentages by the end of 1998. The exchange rate had been 
brought into the corridor in July 1995, and was successfully 
kept in a narrow band between 5 and 6 roubles to the Dollar 
(Appendix A Figure 3). The trade balance never posed any 
threat (Appendix A Figure 4).  Oil, gas and mineral exports 
were virtually guaranteed, at least in volume. This allowed 
Russia to purchase western goods deemed superior in quality. 
Following liberalisation, imports had risen sharply while 
non-oil, non-mineral, non-military imports and exports were 
insignificant. Russian manufacturers were largely unable to 
complete orders for their own domestic markets, far less for 
foreign markets (Chiodo and Owyang (2002: 11), Ivanova and 
Wyplosz (2000:17-19)).
Some economic progress had been achieved over the period 
1992-1997, but much remained to be done on both the 
structural and macroeconomic levels and, in some aspects, 
the Russian economy rapidly deteriorated after 1996 president 
election. There was no doubt that one of the main reasons 
for Russia’s macroeconomic fragility was fiscal problems. The 
federal budget had been in deficit from the beginning of the 
transition. Local and regional government were not allowed to 
run deficits and indeed, managed to maintain a rough balance. 
By end of 1997, the situation was no better. At about 7 percent 
of GDP, the deficit was not unbearable since the domestic 
public debt was at zero to start with, in 1992 (Appendix A Figure 
3) (Ivanova and Wyplosz (2000:16-17).  However, the biggest 
weakness in the Russian economy was low tax collection. 
Many firms did not pay taxes and the government did not 
pay for its purchases, which permitted barter   transactions, 
especially   at   the   regional   government   level   Stiglitz 
(2002:152). The quantitative decline in tax revenue went hand 
in hand with a qualitative deterioration, as non-cash tax receipts 
(in the form of promissory notes - vekselya - or other non-
monetary payments) reached 26 percent of taxes in 1996 and 
20 percent in 1997 Chapman and Mulino (2001:7). Additionally 
the majority of tax revenue came from taxes that were shared 
between the regional and federal governments, which fostered 
competition among the different levels of government over 
tax revenue distribution. Certainly, this kind of tax sharing 
can result in conflicting incentives for regional governments 
and lead them to help firms conceal part of their taxable profit 
from the federal government in order to reduce the firms’ total 
tax payments. In return, the firm would then make transfers 
to the accommodating regional government (a kind of barter 
trade). This can explain  why  federal  revenues  dropped  more 
rapidly  than  regional  revenues (Desai, (2000:49), Shleifer 
and Treisman (2000:100-149)).
As the authorities were unable to raise adequate government 
revenue and the IMF prohibited the Central Bank of Russia 
from borrowing in 1995 (the disinflation program), the 
government relied on the market to pick up government short-
term bills (GKO’s) and long –term bonds (OFZ’s), in the process 
attracting domestic  and  foreign  investors  to  have  access  to 
the  government  securities market. The first debt instruments, 
short-term GKO, had been issued in small quantities in May 
1993, but an efficient GKO market soon developed. At their 
lowest levels in the final quarter of 1997, the annualised yields 
of government securities  averaged  25-30  percents,  far  higher 
than  comparable  rates  abroad (Buchs (1999:688); Shleifer 
and Treisman (2000:100-149), Chiodo and Owyang (2002: 
11), Desai, (2000:48)). The high real returns of this instrument 
made it very appealing to Russian and foreign investors, even 
though the later were not initially allowed to invest and then 
had to hold their assets in special S-accounts, which severely 
limited the repatriation of their earnings. In spite of the lifting of 
the earlier requirement limiting purchases of government bonds 
to domestic investors, this was not adequate to finance the 
Russian fiscal problem (Desai, (2000:49), Chiodo and Owyang, 
(2002:12)).Under these conditions, at the beginning of 1996, 
the government had decided to remove the limitations on the 
purchase of government securities by non-resident investors, 
promoting foreign investment, especially short-run capital in 
flows to Russian. So, by late 1997, roughly 30 percent of the 
GKO market was accounted for by non-residents, by direct 
contract or via the banking system. Of the CBR and Sberbank 
(the largest State Saving Bank), which held about 50 percent 
of GKOs, assisted the government by purchasing new GKO 
issues at the primary auctions. The remaining GKOs were held 
by the domestic commercial banks, owned by the oligarchs. 
The OFZ’s market did not develop so dynamically because of 
investor uncertainty (Ivanova and Wyplosz (2000:33)).
Secondly, there was some fragility in the banking system. 
Russian bank assets fell below that of liabilities and this 
weakness was often seen as stemming from the liability side. 
The most striking feature of Russian bank liabilities was a 
low and falling share of deposits, apart from the Sbenrbank 
(Savings Bank of the Russian Federation). From 1995 to 1997, 
deposits fell by some 11 percent, reaching 49 percent of overall 
liabilities.  Without households’ deposits going to the Sberbank, 
which absorbed some 75 percent of households’ deposits, the 
ratio of deposits to liabilities would have been much lower, well 
below 30 percent. Also, the composition of deposits changed; 
there was contraction in mainly long- term deposits (time and 
saving deposits, including currency ones). So, the overall fall 
in deposits harmed Russian banks in as much as it reduced 
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access to a cheap source of liquidity; moreover, as the public 
turned to more volatile forms of deposit, banks became more 
exposed to sudden liquidity shortfalls due to loss of confidence 
(Chapman and Mulino (2001:11)). However, in 1996, capital 
liberalisation allowed Russian banks to borrow more from 
foreign markets.  Most of these transactions were secured by 
Russian banks’ purchase of GKO on the domestic market and 
registered as a deterioration in the balance sheets of Russian 
banks as a rise in their foreign liabilities as a proportion of 
assets (mostly in domestic government securities that were to 
become worthless), from 7 percent of their assets in 1994, to 
17 percent in 1997 (Desai (2000:49)).
 
But  the  glimpse  of  recovery seen  in  1997,  when  Russia 
became  the lowest-risk member of the world market according 
to her international credit rating and with greater domestic 
stability, was not to last long. The international situation 
of the foreign market was badly hit by the East Asian crisis 
in the summer of 1997, and in November 1997, the rouble 
came under speculative attack. The Central Bank of Russia 
defended the currency by reducing its foreign- exchange 
reserves. At the same time, non-resident holders of short-term 
government bills (GKOs) signed forward contracts with the 
CBR to exchange roubles for foreign currency, which enabled 
them to hedge exchange rate risk in the interim period.   (These 
forward contracts were called NDFs - non-delivery forward) 
(see  Małecki,  Sławiński,  Piasecki  and  ?uławska  (2001: 
137-153), Chiodo and Owyang (2002:12)). Also, a substantial 
amount of the liabilities of large Russian commercial banks 
were off the balance sheets, consisting mostly of forward 
contracts signed with foreign investors (Desai (2000: 49), 
Chiodo and Owyang (2002:12)).
The East Asian crisis created an enormous additional strain 
in contrast to the expectation that the oil demand would not 
fall but, rather, increase. The resulting imbalance between the 
demand and supply of oil created a dramatic fall in crude oil 
prices, to a reduction of over 40 percent in the fist six months of 
1998, compared to average prices in 1997. An accompanying 
fall in nonferrous metal prices meant that Russia’s oil 
industry ceased being profitable as oil prices were lower than 
extraction costs and transportation, given the exchange rates 
at the time  (Stiglitz  (2002:145)).  So,  this  other  external 
shock  hurt  the  Russian economy, especially the balance of 
trade and Russia’s ability to generate tax revenue. According 
to Alexashenko (1999, 2010) and Stiglitz (2002), the balance 
of trade deficit shrank five times between 1995 and mid-1998.
 
At the beginning of 1998, the Russian situation began to 
deteriorate due to increasing uncertainty as investors turned 
their attention towards Russian default risk. Even when the 
government promised to pay back in dollars, it faced high 
interest rates (yields on dollar–denominated debt issued by the 
Russian government  rose  from  slightly  over  10  percent  to 
almost  50  percent,  45 percentage points higher than interest 
rate the U.S government had to pay on its Treasury bills at 
the time) in the market though there was a high probability of 
default.   In this situation, the Russian government wanted to 
promote a stable investment environment by submitting a new 
tax code to the Duma, with fewer and more efficient taxes, 
in February 1998. The new tax code was approved in 1998, 
yet some crucial parts that were intended to increase federal 
revenue were ignored.  In addition, Russian officials sought 
IMF funding but agreement could not be reached.  Even 
though the interest rate was lower than it might otherwise have 
been many investors believed that Russia was too politically 
important to fail. The investment banks made loans to Russian, 
they whispered about how big the IMF bailout would have to 
be (see Chiodo and Owyang (2002: 12-14), Stiglitz (2002:146).
However, by late March 1998, the political environment became 
worse. On March 23 1998, President Yeltsin fired his entire 
government, including Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
and appointed Sergei Kiriyenko. At the same time, there was 
conflict between the executive branch, the Duma, and the 
CBR. Prompted by threats from Yeltsin to dissolve Parliament, 
the Duma confirmed Kiriyenko’s appointment on April 24 1998, 
after a month of struggling (Chiodo and Owyang (2002 :13)).
By mid-May 1998, it was clear that the government would not 
be able to fix the situation on its own and that only an IMF 
loan might have restored confidence. On 27 May 1998, the 
demand for bonds had plummeted so much that yields were 
less than 50 percent so that the government failed to sell 
enough bonds at its weekly auction to refinance the debt 
becoming due (Appendix A Figure.2). The government formed 
an anti crisis plan, requested assistance from the West, and 
began bankruptcy proceedings against three companies with 
large debts from non-payment of back taxes. The spreading 
expectation of impending devaluation made the exchange rate 
for six-month forward contracts rise with respect to the nominal 
rate by as much as 24 percent in June.  From the end of May, 
the interest rate differentials between outstanding GKOs and 
currency– denominated bonds widened sharply and reached 
some 85 percentage points in late June. Domestic agents 
consistently shifted to goods that traditionally represented a 
shelter in times of troubled foreign currency. From mid-May 
1998 on, money flows from the government securities markets 
to the foreign exchange market caused the rouble to come 
under attack (Chapman and Mulino (2001: 23) Central Bank 
of the Russian Federation (1998:61)). The remaining GKOs 
were held  by  the  domestic  commercial  banks,  owned  by 
the  oligarchs,  with considerable influence. These oligarchs’ 
interests were mostly in the oil and gas sector, publicly called 
for devaluation. The others, however, were mostly concerned 
by the dollar liabilities of the bank that they controlled, and 
they opposed devaluation, calling instead for an IMF bailout 
(Chapman and Mulino (2001:9-10)).
By May, and certainly by June of 1998, it was clear Russia 
would need outside assistance to maintain its exchange 
rate. Because of this fear of holding roubles, and the lack of 
confidence in the government’s ability to repay its debt, by 
June 1998, the government had to pay an interest rate of 
almost 60 percent on its  rouble  loans  (GKOs)  (Appendix  A 
Figure  2).  In  light  of  this,  the  CBR increased the lending 
rate again in June 1998, however, it could not stop the flight 
of non-residents from government GKO’s.  At the same time, 
the CBR lost its reserves to defend the exchange rate peg. In 
spite of all of the government’s efforts, there was widespread 
knowledge that loans from foreign investors to Russian 
corporations and banks were to come due by the end of 
September (Stiglitz(2002:146)).
By mid - June, it was becoming increasingly clear that the 
storm would hit. Speculators could see how much in the way 
of reserves was left, and as reserves dwindled, betting on 
devaluation became increasingly a one-way bet. They risked 
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almost nothing betting on the rouble’s crash. As expected, the 
IMF came to the rescue with $4.8 billion in July 1998, and 
a GKO swap (Stiglitz (2002:147)). The World Bank was also 
called upon to lend $ 1.5 bn for structural reforms because the 
reformers and their advisers in the IMF feared devaluation, 
believing that it would set off another round of hyperinflation. 
However, this rescue packet disappeared during the following 
two weeks (Stiglitz (2002: 146). After losing so much liquidity, 
the IMF assistance did not provide much relief. The Duma 
eliminated parts of the IMF-endorsed anti-crisis program, 
which eliminated the additional revenues to budget. On August 
17, the government floated the exchange rate, devalued the 
rouble (Appendix A Figure. 3), defaulted on its domestic debt, 
halted payment on rouble-denominated debt (primarily GKOs), 
and declared a 90-day moratorium on payment by commercial 
banks to foreign creditors. The terms of the GKO restructuring 
were announced only one week later. Initially, Russia offered 
to restructure non-residents’ frozen GKOs into 17 year dollar-
denominated Eurobonds. The IMF tried to insist on an equal 
approach to resident and non-resident holders of GKOs, 
but the new Russian government decided to offer different 
restructuring schemes (see Ivanova and Wyplosz (2000:35)).
4.2. motivation for the monetary balance–of-payments 
model’s implementation
The evidence from the above case study suggests of needs to 
re-think how this currency crisis could be predictable. Maybe 
the reason of crisis was simply predictable because of the 
wrong macroeconomic fundament typical first generation 
crisis according to Krugman‘s (1999), Ivanova and Wyplosz 
(2000) and  Süppel  (2002).  Certainly situation  could  be 
more  complicated  as  many authors suggest. According to 
Chapman and Mulino (2001), Russian episode lies between 
‘’first generation model ’’ and twin crises’’ models. In contrast 
Buchs (1999) and Desai (2000) said that the Russian financial 
disaster is a typical example of crisis contagion, although the 
underlying vulnerability of the economy was a problem which 
no investor could ignore like fiscal deficit or the vulnerability if 
the banking system. Similar opinion is represented by Stiglitz 
(2002), but he emphasises that the Russian crisis was a 
result of an overvalued exchange  rate,  which  was  result 
of  wrong  IMF  stabilisation  program  and contagion from the 
East Asian crisis. He also suggests the sharp decline in oil 
prices on which the Russian government revenue depended 
heavily. The most interesting view is presented by Gurvich and 
Andryakov (2002). They suggested of existing the ‘’hostage 
effect’’10 in the Russia case. Their model suggests that the 
more reserved the government was, the stronger its adverse 
effect of the crisis. This effect incorporates the problem of 
coronation, as do most second-generation models. Gaidar 
(1999) pointed to the political hopeless and corruption as 
the main reason of currency crisis. In contrast, Sutela (1999) 
suggested that it was the third model generation of currency 
crisis, which was the mostly typical financial crisis combination 
with the currency crisis. Additionally, Chiodo and Owyang 
(2002) pressed that different aspects of all models of currency 
crisis could be found.
As we can see, there was a very dynamic debate among the 
economists as to what were the reasons of Russian currency 
crisis were. It can suggest to set the hypothesis whether 
the Russian episode was the typical bad macroeconomic 
fundament crisis (first generation crisis), or maybe it was 
more complicated case. This way of analyse allows to better 
understand the implications of IMF stabilisation program in the 
context of Russian currency crisis. In this case it is correct to 
use the Cumby and van Wijnbergen’s (1989) monetary model 
of a balance–of-payments that had a similar length period, 
characteristic of date (monthly date) and estimates for the 
crawling exchange rate regime (Russia had the crawling band 
of exchange rate from July 1996 to November 1997) (Buchs 
(1999:694-696)).
4.3. Empirical methodology
In almost all the derivations, the empirical methodology is 
followed Cumby and Van Wijnbergen’s (1989) model (CVW 
model). However, the exchange regime was implemented in 
the model (from the crawling exchange rate to fixed exchange 
rate). As the result that the exchange rate was in a very 
narrow band in Russia (almost fixed rate) in the period under 
consideration (Appendix A Figure 3).
4.3.1. The model of assumptions
1. Equilibrium of money stock that at the end of each period 
agents change their holdings  of  real  cash  balances  according 
to  the  money  demand  function
(Appendix B - 1):
2. Uncovered interest parity:
it = it*+ Eet +1 − et (2),  where Eet +1 is the exchange rate agents 
expected to prevail at the end of period t+1 given information 
available at the end of period t.
3. Foreign interest rate is exogenous: i*t=i
*
t-1+
 ut 
(3) where ut ~ N (0,σn
2)
4. Purchasing power parity:
pt  = et (4) where pt* is exogenous and exchange rate is in the 
form of log, constant and equal to 1 ( Appendix B -2).
5. They assumed that all money is high-powered money 
(Appendix B-3) and stable balance sheet of central bank (the 
net worth and government deposit are neglected) result that:
mt  = ln(Rt + Dt ) (5)  where Rt foreign  assets  of  central 
bank  (for  e.g.  foreign Treasuries or bonds), and Dt domestic 
assets of central bank (for e.g. government securities, loans to 
commercial banks). The foreign asset is presents in Russian 
rubbles (domestic currency).
The domestic currency value of the central bank‘s  foreign 
assets is affected by exchange rate fluctuations and foreign 
exchange market interventions. The domestic currency 
changes (e.g. et ↑) will change the value  of  assets denominated 
in foreign currency ( Rt ↑). This gain from foreign assets as 
a result of devaluation can  be used discretely to cover the 
government deficit (increasing the value of foreign assets 
allows an increase in the purchasing power of home treasury 
bills through the operation of the open market -↑ domestic 
assets of central bank- therefore, the assets in balance will 
not change). Additionally, in this case, the devaluation will not 
allow increase in the high-money stock. Monetization thus 
indicates an increase in the domestic assets of the central 
bank, although it implies a rise in the currency value of the 
bank’s foreign assets. For that reason it is included when 
calculating domestic credit changes and excluded when 
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estimating reserve changes. So, in this model,
Rt is the measure of central bank foreign assets and  Ft is 
the foreign currency value of central bank foreign assets 
( Ft   = Rt / eo where eo is the exchange rate in some base 
period).
6. Domestic credit growth is exogenously given and it is 
necessary to finance the finance deficit:
Dt +1  = Dt (1 + gt +1 ) (6) where gt +1 is the rate of domestic credit 
growth between the end of t and the end of t+1.
The financial deficit and exchange policy are independent. 
This assumption allows to examining the first generation 
model (linear rules in policy makers). If this assumption does 
not pass, then the multiple outcomes should be analysed (see 
Obstfeld’s (1986 a,b, 1994) model). In addition, the future 
domestic credit growth is unknown to market investors at 
every point in time and depends on two kinds of  disturbances: 
permanent  ( πt +1 = πt  + εt where εt ~ N (0,σ ε ) )  and  transitory 
stochastic ( δ t  ~ N (0,σ δ ) ) and εt and δ t are independent. 
Hence
gt +1  = π t +1  + δ t +1  (7)
 
7.  The central bank is assumed to have established a fixed       
exchange ( et ) rate under which the exchange rate develops 
as et +1  = et . Market investors assume that the fixed exchange 
rate will not be held by the central bank in all circumstances. 
They form some expectation about the next period’s exchange 
rate; agents have to assess the credibility of the monetary 
and exchange rate policy. The ability and willingness of the 
authorities to maintain a fixed exchange rate will depend 
decisively on whether that exchange rate policy is consistent 
with the goals of the authorities’ monetary and fiscal policy. 
Nevertheless, the fiscal policy is strongly determined by 
political and social impacts (Chapter 4.1.).
 
8.  A worsening public sector deficit increases the probability 
of an unstable fixed exchange rate, so we can assume that 
the authorities will abandon the fixed exchange rate and move 
to a floating one. The probability at the end of time t is that 
the central bank will abandon the fixed exchange rate at the 
end of time t+1, denoted as Pt. Then the probability of holding 
the fixed exchange rate is (1 − Pt). Market investors can form 
their expectations of future exchange rates from the average 
of the current fixed exchange rate and the rate expected 
to materialise conditional on a floating exchange rate and 
weighted by the respective probability
of occurrence:       
Eet +1  = Pt  *  Eet
f + (1 − Pt)  *  et (8) where Eetf is the exchange 
rate agents expect to prevail if the central bank allows the 
exchange rate to float at the end of period t+1.
Certainly, with the uncovered interest parity assumption and 
formation of market investor expectation differences between 
the domestic and foreign interest rate will increase when the 
credibility of the fixed exchange rate decreases (Pt ↑) and 
when the size of the depreciation expected, given that a 
collapse occurs, increases (Appendix B-4).
9.  In the terms of central bank policy, some simple criteria are 
employed in deciding whether to hold the fixed exchange rate 
or not. The central bank will fix the  exchange  rate  as  long 
as  reserve  losses  do  not  fall  to  critical  level R. Whenever 
reserves fall to R , then the exchange rate will be allowed to 
float (Appendix B-5). In addition, it is assumed that agents 
do not know  R with certainty so  that  they only estimate the 
prior  probability in  each  period  the possible value that R may 
have. Thus the critical level of net foreign reserve has some 
interval. Certainly, R cannot exceed the current reserve level 
if there is no currency crisis, with the aim that the upper limit 
is the currency level of reserve ( Rt
U). On the other hand, the 
lower limit for the critical level of net foreign reserves is much 
more difficult to pinpoint. In this model, CVW’s assumption of 
a lower critical level of foreign reserves as CVW (1989) was 
incorporated. This assumption allows that the central bank 
might have negative net foreign reserves which were a case of 
Russia.   Foreign assets exceeded foreign liabilities throughout 
most of the period (June 1995 to October 1998). After the 
crisis, negative levels of net foreign reserves were notable, 
so that the assumption is reasonable (Appendix A Figure 1). 
In addition, CVW assume that additional foreign credit will not 
available during a crisis and only become available after a 
policy reform.  The lower limit on the possible critical value for 
net reserves will be minus the central bank’s currency gross 
foreign liabilities ( RtL ) . 
Apart  from  other  factors  on  which  the  central  bank’s 
decisions  may depend and which can be considered more 
complex than only assuming some critical reserve level 
(Appendix B-6). In the monetary balance model, the most 
important matter for market investors is the money supply. 
Therefore, money supply mainly impacts on real exchange 
rates (which can indicate the pressure on the exchange rate 
policy via domestic prices) and the change in domestic credit 
is exogenous so that the market agents only worry about the 
level of reserves.  As only reserve levels can help to hold the 
fixed exchange rate, the result is that agents do not care about 
other factors that can impact on the central bank’s decisions. 
Obviously, the uncertainty about the level of reserve at which 
central bank makes the decision of changing the exchange 
rate policy purpose, is some way of modelling uncertainty 
about monetary policy the decision rules.
4.3.2. Devaluation model
Firstly, this combination of eq. (1), (2), (4), (8) allows the 
formation of market investor expectations to be taken into 
consideration assuming equilibrium in the money market, thus 
giving (Appendix B-7):             
mt  − et = a − b * it*+ b * Pt *[Eet
f− et ] + nt (11) 
In accordance with eq.(11), money demand depends 
essentially on  three economic components:  the  credibility  of 
holding  a  fixed  exchange  rate ( a − b * it* ), the probability of a 
floating exchange rate( Pt ) and the size of the loss by domestic 
currency holders due to devaluation(Eet
f− 
_
et ). The equation 
(11) is the result of using the international parity condition 
under uncertainty where the probability of  the  existing floats 
exchange ( Pt )  is  the  main  measure of  this uncertainty.
Secondly, the central bank can control the level of commercial 
bank reserves through its instruments (like required reserves 
and reserve requirement) so the amount of money in circulation 
depends on the domestic and foreign assets of the central 
bank. Certainly the central bank does not want to lose its 
foreign reserves to the same extent that the model of collapse 
probability requires for only concentrating  on  the  growth  of 
domestic  credit  ( gt +1 ).  In  other  words,  the probability ( Pt ) 
is at the end of the period when the central bank will abandon 
Malgorzata SulimierskaEvaluating IMF Intervention Ten Years after the Russian Crisis: 
Modelling the Impact of Macroeconomic Fundamentals and Economic Policy
36IJBIT / Volume 6 / Issue 1 / October - March 2013 |
the fixed exchange rate, at the end of time t+1, depends on 
the probability that the financial deficit will increase sufficiently 
(thereby domestic credit). While) t +1 defined as the smallest 
realisation of domestic credit growth that causes reserve to fall 
to  R at the end of period t+1 (CVW (1989:119)), where gt +1  
is held and the central bank keeps the policy of fixed exchange 
rates depends on the authorities noting that reserves have met 
the critical value and, so will announce at the end of t+1 that 
the exchange rate will float in the next period t+2. In this case, 
Pt = 1, and in this manner, money equilibrium given by the 
eq.(10) (Appendix B-8,9): 
* 
 
 
mˆ t +1−et +1  = a − b ∗ it +1  − b ∗ ( Eeˆt +2  − et +1 ) + nt +1    
	  
(12)
where mˆ t +1  = ln(R + Dt +1 ∗ (1 + gˆ t +1 )	   is the log of the money supply at 
the end of period t+1 given that collapse of the fixed exchange 
rate occurred at the end of period t+1 and  given that mˆ t +1  = ln(R + Dt +1 ∗ (1 + gˆ t +1 )	  is 
continued, 
* 
 
 
mˆ t +1−et +1  = a − b ∗ it +1  − b ∗ ( Eeˆt +2  − et +1 ) + nt +1    
	  
is  the expected floating exchange rate at 
period t+2 after the currency collapse and                et +1 = et +1   = et  
	    
In order to calculate the probability of the collapse of the 
fixed exchange rate, I have to provide a model for mˆ t +1  = ln(R + Dt +1 ∗ (1 + gˆ t +1 )	     by 
specifying 
* 
 
 
mˆ t +1−et +1  = a − b ∗ it +1  − b ∗ ( Eeˆt +2  − et +1 ) + nt +1    
	  
 .
The rational expectation of agents was assumed and exchange 
rate is
floating, the money demand function was used eq. (12) to 
obtain 
* 
 
 
mˆ t +1−et +1  = a − b ∗ it +1  − b ∗ ( Eeˆt +2  − et +1 ) + nt +1    
	  
.
From Assumption (3) we can see that 
Equation (16) is different from the adequate equation in CVW’s 
results (eq.6). According  to  these  mathematical  calculations, 
it  seems  that  CVW’s  model required additional amends the 
differences between the models are the lack of random error 
terms in my model (Appendix B-10).
Taking Muth’s (1960) assumption of the stochastic structure 
of domestic credit growth ( gt ), the optimal forecast of future 
domestic credit growth is obtained by:
where  λ relies  on  the  constant  variance  of  the permanent 
and transitory stochastic disturbance of domestic credit growth 
(from assumption  (7)   of   the   model).  Furthermore,  equation 
(17)  is   given  for Et gt +T  where  T∈(1, +∞)  but  in  order  to 
simplify the  notation,  we  can  use:
 _
Et gt +T = gt
 
To  compute  eq.  (16),  its  last  term  has  to  be  calculated. 
In  addition  from assumption (6) there is:
E t +1 mˆ t +i + 2  = E t +1 ln (Rt +i + 2  + Dt +i + 2 ) 
	   
We know that after the collapse of the fixed peg, the exchange 
rate will float freely, with the result that reserves will stay 
constant at R. In that way, I can compute:     _  
Et +1mˆ t +i+2  = Et +1 ln[R + Dt +1 (1 + gˆ t +1 )(1 + gt +2 )(1 + gt +3 )...(1 + gt +i +2 )]	  
Then, by using the first-order approximation of the Taylor 
series, I can calculate
i 
	  
ˆ ˆ Dt (1 + gˆ t +1 )
 	  
(19). mt +2+i  = mt +1  + R + Dt (1 + gˆ t +1 ) 
∗ ∑ gˆ t + j +1 
j =1 
If we assume that mˆ t +1  = ln(R + Dt +1 ∗ (1 + gˆ t +1 )	    is the smallest increase in domestic 
credit to cause the  collapse  of  the  fixed  exchange  rate,  to 
the  same  extent,  by  taking  the expectations conditions of
mˆ t +1  = ln(R + Dt +1 ∗ (1 + gˆ t +1 )	  ,we get the weighted average of expectation based on 
information from the last period of domestic credit growth  and 
drawn 
domestic credit growth  From (19) 
we obtain 
estic credit growth gˆ t +1 : gt +1  = λ ∗ gt  + (1 − λ) ∗ gˆ t +1 . From eq.(19), we obtain 
	  
	  
mˆ t +2+i 
	  
= mˆ 
	  
t +1  + 
Dt (1 + gˆ t +1 ) 
R + Dt (1 + gˆ t +1 ) 
∗ (i[λ ∗ gt 
	  
+ (1 − λ) ∗ gˆ t +1 ])(20).
 
Afterwards, I can use the expression above to compute the 
unknown terms in eq.(16). Thus we can obtain:
 
Afterwards, I can use the expression above to compute the unknown terms 
	  
in eq.(16). Thus we can obtain: 
	  
   ∞   �    b   �
i D g
 
1 ∑� 
	  
� Et +1 mˆ t +i +2 = mˆ t +1  + t 
(1 + ˆ t +1 ) ∗ ([λ ∗ g t + (1 − λ ) ∗ gˆ t +1 ]) 	  (21) 1 + b i =0 � 1 + b 
� 
R + Dt (1 + gˆ t +1 ) 
t +1 
2 
Combining eq. (16), (12) and (21) gives (Appendix B-11): 
	  
	  
mˆ t +1 
	  
− et +1 = a − bi*    −  b * 
Dt (1 + gˆ t +1 ) ∗ (λ ∗ gt 
	  
+ (1 − λ ) ∗ gˆ t +1 )+ 1 nt +1 	  
	  
(22) 
1 − b R + Dt (1 + gˆ t +1 ) 1 + b 
	  
Compare to CVW’s model, (eq.(8))  the sign before the a  and
bi*t +1 is the opposite in my calculations but this sign is consistent 
with economic theory (the international interest  rate  has  to 
have  a  negative impact  on  the  demand  for money). As  can 
be  seen  from  the  equation above, mˆ t +1  = ln(R + Dt +1 ∗ (1 + gˆ t +1 )	   cannot  be  directly 
computed, therefore mˆ t +1  = ln(R + D  +1 ∗ (1 + gˆ t +1 )	   depends on unknown parameters for 
agents at time t+1 like: *it +1 and the money demand disturbance 
nt +1.  The aim of directly computing 
mˆ t +1  = ln(R + Dt +1 ∗ (1 + gˆ t +1 )	  numerically requires 
finding the value probability Pt at the end of t of the collapse at 
the end of period t+1:
Pt ( gt +1  ≥ gˆ t +1 )	    (23)
From assumption (7)
it can obtained, In whatever manner, 
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R is unknown and g t+1 is a function of it, so  to  the  same 
extent  the  collapse  probability  cannot  be  computed  by 
integrating the  density for gt +1 but  we  can  firstly reckon  the 
probability of collapse conditional on   R 	   and then integrate the 
possible value that  R 	   may take on (CVW (1989:121)). Hence 
we obtain:
The combining of eq.(25) and eq. (22) will enable the collapse 
probability to be computed and give a full solution for the 
model.
 
4.3.3 General description of the estimate procedure.
In order to reckon the probability of the collapse of the fixed 
exchange rate, the estimating procedure was divided into two 
parts. Firstly, the calculation of the value of parameters will 
be made such as parameters of money demand  functions: 
a, b and σn eq. (1) with assumption (4) that pt  = et , the 
parameters in the money forecasting rule: λ and σ2 eq. (17), 
and the variance of the changes in the foreign interest rate 
(Appendix B Table 2). The computation of the parameters of 
monetary demand (eq. 10) required that it was sensible to use 
instrumental variables to eliminate the potential endogenous 
effect of the domestic interest rate. According  to  CVW’s 
paper,  there  were  two  instrumental  variables:  foreign 
interest rates (eq. 3) and constant. (see CVW (1989:121)). 
The residuals from the monetary demand equations were 
investigated to examine the phenomenon of autocorrelation 
or heteroscedasticity between them. For instance, in CVW’s 
model, they examine the hypothesis of autocorrelation by 
using tests based on MA(n) process. In this model the process 
AR(n) was  investigated instead of MA(n). The reason is 
that MA(n) can be converted to the AR(n) and MA(n) as the 
finished process of AR(n).  The hypothesis of autocorrelation 
was estimated by using the test based on AR(n) process. Then 
an assumption (3) in the theoretical model  (eq.  (3))  was 
analyzed  by  using  the  Dickey-  Fuller  test.  If  the  null 
hypothesis is rejected, this means that the foreign interest rate 
followed a random path (Appendix B Table 3): 
i*= i*t −1 + ut    where ut  ~ N (0,σ n
2 )
 
Lastly, the parameter of the forecasting rule for domestic credit 
growth λ was calculated. CVW simplified the calculation by 
introducing the definition of υt+1  as a one-period forecast error 
for domestic credit growth realisation at the end of period t+1.
 υt+1  is from gt+1  = Egt+1 +υt+1 (26),  and with the forecasting rule 
for domestic credit growth (17), they obtained
 Et g t +1  = λ ∗ Et −1 g t  + (1 − λ) ∗ g t (27).
The first part of equation (27) λ ∗ Et −1 g t came from the 
formation of rules of  expectation  where  past  expectation 
formation  has  an  impact  on  future expectation. The second 
part (1 − λ) ∗ g t comes from the eq. (17) when  i =0. From 
eq. (27) and (26) they derived:
 
g t +1 − g t = υt +1  − λ ∗υt (28).
 
By assuming that all information is available to market 
investors and market agents are rational, they calculated the 
forecast for domestic credit realisation which contained past 
forecast errors, so all one-period-ahead forecast errors are 
uncorrelated. In accordance with eq. (28) the variance and 
first auto - covariance of  the  first  difference in  the  growth 
rate  of  domestic credit  was calculated:
 
g t +1− g t as (1 − λ) συ and − λσ υ, respectively. However, the 
variance formula was different compare to CVW’s model 
(Appendix B-12). By using the sample estimates of variance 
and the auto-covariance of the first difference in domestic 
credit, I computed the λ by using the combination of these 
formulae.
 
When I obtained all the necessary parameters to calculate
mˆt +1  = ln(R + Dt +1 ∗ (1 + gˆ t +1 )	    in eq. (22), I could derive the formula for
 
mˆ t +1  = ln(R + Dt +1 ∗ (1 + gˆ t +1 )	   by transformations of eq.(22) which depended
 
only on the unknown  R 	   . Then, by using this formula, I computed 
the integer of eq. (25) with respect to the level of foreign reserve 
and in that way, obtained the probability of the collapse of the 
fixed exchange rate.
4.4. The data and explanatory variables
Application of this model to the Russian experience in the 
late 1990s requires  estimates  from  the  money  demand 
equation, followed by those  for domestic credit, foreign capital 
shocks. The description of the specific data series used for 
the calculations is in Appendix C Table 1. In my analysis, two 
different data sources were implemented in this analysis: 
IMF statistics (IFS- International Financial Statistics) and the 
Monthly Bulletin of the Central Bank of Russia (Central Bank 
of Russia: Monthly Bulletin). Since both datasets have their 
strengths and weaknesses, both were used in my empirical 
analysis in order to check the robustness of the results. My 
model consisted of monthly observations from December 
1995, to December 1998. The choice of this period was due to 
it being one of the most stable in political and economic terms - 
after the establishment of the autonomy of the Central Russian 
Bank, incorporating the disinflation program, and several 
official  confiscations  of  population  cash holdings in January 
1991, July 1993 (see Appendix A Table 1 and section 3.1). 
Unfortunately, the monetary base in the Russian case was no 
recorded in this date. Approximations were implemented - M1 
and M2.   As a result, the method of calculation in comparison 
with CVW (1989)’s paper was changed. Moreover, data from 
the consolidation balance sheet of the banking system (the 
monetary authorities -central bank- plus the commercial banks) 
was implemented.
4.5. Empirical implementation and results
In this section, the discussion is about an estimation of the time 
series of the collapse probability for the Russian fixed exchange 
rate that lasted from December 1995 to January 1998. Firstly, 
the estimations of the money demand function, assumptions 
about the random path of interest rates were presented and 
then calculations of the parameter in the forecasting rules 
for domestic credit growth, and then the results of probability 
calculations were discussed. There are two different set of 
approximations for the monetary base (M1 and M2) from two 
data sources (IFS and CBR). Because of that four sets of 
probability result were analysed (Appendix C Figure 1- 4).
All the estimates for money demand looked reasonable 
(Appendix C Table1), the sign and size of parameters were 
consistent with economy theory and the empirical analysis of 
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money demand (Gerlach-Kristen (2001:55-554)). However, 
for the IFS data, there was the problem of heteroshedasticity, 
but an examination of the residuals did not show any 
problem with the autocorrelation (Appendix C: Table 1). 
To reduce the problem of heteroshedasciticy, White’s 
matrix was used. In estimating the base money demand 
parameters in equation (1) with assumption (4) any technique 
with instrumental variables were not employed due to 
the Hausman - Wu tests for the two instruments (constant 
term and foreign interest  rate)  and  one  instrument  (foreign 
interest  rate)  rejected  the  null hypothesis.   In the case of 
the IFS data, it seemed that it did not have to take account of 
potential endogeneity problems.
On the other hand, these estimates of the CBR data (Appendix 
C: Table 1) suggest some problems with autocorrelation and 
heteroshedasticity. Firstly, the instrumental variables were 
implemented because of a potential endogeneity problem. 
A wrong sign for the coefficient before the interest rate was 
obtained. This suggests that there is problem with the omitted 
variables such as income or approximations of inflation, or 
there is a problem with the default risk.  However, to obtain 
a more detailed picture of the Russian crisis and to simplify 
the analysis, the assumption was implemented that these 
results are as good as the results from using the IFS data. 
In addition, the residuals from the money demand function 
were calculated so that assumption nt  ~ N (0,σ n ) in eq. (1) is 
correct.
According to the results of the estimates for IFS, any problems 
with autocorrelation by using the Durbin-Watson d-statistic 
and Durbin’s alternative test for autocorrelation were not 
discovered. The interesting and useful aspects of these tests 
is that although the null hypothesis was originally derived 
for an AR(p) process (for Durbin-Watson test it is AR(1)), 
these tests are powerful against MA(p) processes as well. 
Due to this serendipitous result, the MA(p) and AR(p) are 
locally equivalent alternatives under the null hypothesis. The 
only problem was  heteroscedasticity,  but  the  correlation 
using  White’s  matrix  allows  the assumption about the 
residual from the money demand equation nt  ~ N (0,σ n ) to 
be upheld.
The next step was to investigate the assumption about the 
random path of interest rates. The modified Dickey-fuller t 
test proposed by Graham, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) was 
implemented. This Dickey-Fuller unit root test allowed finding 
that the coefficient of  i*t −1 is equal to one (the null hypothesis: 
it is not a static process). The null hypothesis of the unit root 
in the foreign interest rate is not rejected at a reasonably 
significant level of 5 percentages, the same extent at which 
the foreign interest rate is assumed to be correct (Appendix C, 
Table 2). Additionally, both tests of autocorrelation for the first 
difference of i* were also carried out and yielded no evidence 
of autocorrelation.
The last thing before computing the integral of eq. (25), was 
the computation of λ. Using the sample estimate of variance 
and the first auto - covariance of  the  first  difference in 
domestic  credit (Table 1) obtained  λ = 0.43946 for IFS data 
and respectively for CBR data  λ = 0.43845.  In order to simplify 
all the calculations, one value of  λ = 0.44 for both sets of data 
was used.11
Table 1
Date 
Source
The  sample  variance  
of  the first  difference  in  
domestic credit (1 − λ2 )σ υ 
2
First auto-covariance 
of the first difference in 
domestic credit − λσ υ 
2
IFS 33.7447 -18.3174
CBR 33.744 -18.3162
Source: My own calculations based on Table 2 and 3 from Appendix C.
The series of one-step devaluation probabilities for the Russian 
fixed exchange rate was calculated in the followed way. In 
estimating the collapse probabilities, the equation was solved 
by substituting the parameter estimates above and the data 
associated with each observation for four different sets of data 
to obtain an estimate of the critical values for domestic credit 
growth in each period. The  residuals  parameters  were  ignored, 
which  appeared  in  eq. (22) because this residual behaviour 
is treated as white noise. Then eq. (25) was integrated to get 
the probability. As this integration from eq. (25) could only be 
computed by using the numerical integration,  CVW used the 
Simpson’s rule- the trapezoidal rule. In this paper eq. (25) was 
also computed  by using the trapezoidal rule (Appendix B-13).
The probability estimates (Appendix C: Figure 1-4) look quite 
reasonable, both in the estimated magnitude of the probability 
(interval 0-1) and in their behaviour over time (Appendix A, 
Chapter 3.1) Estimates for the collapse probability were also 
found, along with domestic credit growth (cumulative growth 
since the end of 1995) (Appendix C: Figure 1-4). These tables 
suggest that the permanent increase in domestic credit growth 
brought about the loss of confidence in the fixed exchange rate 
(Chapter 3.3 eq. (22) and (25)). In other words, the credibility 
of the policy for a fixed exchange rate was undermined even 
when the authorities said that the fiscal and domestic credit 
policies were consistent with the exchange rate. In addition, 
these results also indicate that confidence was never 
fully restored and that just prior to the collapse of the fixed 
exchange rate in 1998, the credibility of the fixed exchange 
regime was extremely low. The estimated probability was quite 
high through all the period except at the beginning and middle 
of 1996. During this period there was a strong disturbance in 
the probability, which could have been caused by changes 
in the fiscal and monetary policy (changes in the exchange 
corridor between January and June)( Buchs (1999:694-696)). 
In the middle of 1997, domestic credit growth exceeded 50 
percent (according to IFS data, and 29 percent in CBR data) 
and the collapse probability started to permanently increase. 
The cumulative point was at the end of 1998, when 78 percent 
(according to IFS, and 65 percent in CBR data) expansion 
in domestic credit growth undermined the credibility of the 
announced fixed exchange rate mechanism and the collapse 
probability rose above 90 percent in August 1998, for all four 
figures. To the same extent, the empirical findings suggest that 
the probability associated with regime changes in August 1998 
was mainly attributable to the speculative pressure in the light 
of deterioration in economic fundamentals (the first generation 
model). In line with expectations, the probability of devaluation 
was found to be in the increased levels of central bank credit 
to the banking system. The increase fiscal deficit and the 
reduction in foreign exchange reserves were also linked to the 
probability of devaluation.
5. ImpLICATION OF ImF’S INTERvENTION
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After the devaluation of the rouble in 1998, the economy 
experienced its first significant growth, which was very 
surprising. This was because Russia is an exporter of natural 
resources and the devaluation of the exchange rate improved 
export conditions and economic growth (Appendix A Figure 
4.). Certainly, this effect was in the short term. However, it can 
illustrate the issue about the importance of the IMF program. 
Throughout the 1990s, Russia operated under the auspices 
and  close  scrutiny  of  a  Fund  (support  and  stabilisation 
program). Another question is how it could happen that the 
IMF did not recognise that Russia was almost typical of a first 
generation crisis through some aspect of other generation 
models (Chapter 4.1. and 4.5).
At the beginning of the 1990s, Russia was under ‘shock 
therapy’, which was strongly promoted by IMF advisors. 
According to this plan, it was reasonable to remove the central 
plan with the decentralisation market system, and secondly, to 
replace public ownership with private property, and eliminate 
or at least reduce the distortions by the liberalisation of trade. 
To the same extent, liberalisation and stabilisation were two of 
the pillars of the radical reforms strategy. The rapid privatisation 
was the third pillar.   In addition, the IMF supported international 
loans to Russia (Stiglitz (2002:136-140)). The SDR loaned 2.8 
billion dollars since 1992 up to 1994 but, as the first tranche 
of loans, they did not carry mandatory programs. Then, after 
the economic problem in 1994, the IMF gave standby credit 
of $ 6.8 billion to improve the reforms of the monetary policy 
and improve fiscal policy tightness. However, the IMF did not 
even suggest using the exchange rate as an anchor; it merely 
supported the Russian decision to adopt the ‘corridor’, the 
crawling peg. The IMF’s second large-scale program came in 
the run up to 1996 election.   However, the conditions after 
the reforms were quite vague and, as matters grew worse, 
the government did not seem to realise the seriousness of the 
situation. It concentrated its efforts on improving the budget, 
with no positive results.  A new program was agreed upon in 
July 1998 when the crisis was already under way (Ivanovo 
and Wyplosz (2000:4)). The government’s publicly stated 
strategy,  the  July Package,  contained three  main  elements: 
a radical  tightening  of  the  federal  budget  intended  to 
solve  once  and  for  all persistent fiscal imbalances, an 
increase in international reserves, the lengthening of the debt 
maturity to reduce vulnerability arising from the short-term 
structure of  domestic  debt.  The  fiscal  part  of  the  package 
aimed  at  improving  tax collection, reducing tax arrears, 
establishing treasury control on budgetary expenditure and 
cutting federal expenditure commitments. In addition, the 
government  pledged  to  submit  to  the  ‘Duma’  wishes.  The 
IMF  decided  to increase its financial support in 1998 by $ 
11.2 billion, $ 4.8 billion of which were immediately  disbursed 
with  the  explicitly  stated  aim  of  increasing  foreign reserves. 
Another part of the July package was the GKO swap (Ivanova 
and Wyplosz(2000:29)). All these procedures, however, did 
not bring improvement to the Russian situation. Certainly, it 
suggests some errors within the IMF program.
One of the most discussed reforms is Russia’s adoption of 
the principle of mass privatisation (Chapter 4.1).  Speed was 
seen as essential for the reform process to establish a new 
architecture for the market so that it ignored many important 
aspects. The high inflation after freeing prices in 1992, wiped 
out the savings of most Russians. There were not enough 
people in the country that had the  money to  buy the  enterprises 
being privatised. Even  if  they could  have afforded to buy 
the enterprises, it would have been difficult to revitalise them, 
given the high interest rates and lack of financial institutions 
to provide capital (see Shleifer and Treisman (2000)). So, 
privatisation was carried between the old communist political 
friends who used their influence to garner assets worth billions, 
after paying only a pittance. Also, most of the new owners 
of firms were the old managers. They did not know how to 
operate in the new environment so that they focused on what 
they could get out of the firm in the next few years. In addition, 
the IMF concentrated mainly on privatisation, giving short shrift 
to competition law (Stiglitz (2002:155)).
 
Another issue was the lack of market institutions to control the 
legal and regulatory frameworks. In soviet Russia, everything 
was organised according to the central plan, although this 
system allowed for co-operation between the managers of 
firms and central and local politicians in some respects. These 
activities were necessary for the functioning of the Social 
economy. Therefore, in communist Russia circumvention of 
the law, if not breaking it outright, became part of the way of 
life, a precursor to the breakdown of the rule of law, which was 
to mark the transition. Nevertheless, the market economy led 
to corruption in Russia (Stiglitz (2002:138-139)).
Thirdly, the IMF focused mostly on macroeconomic aspects, 
and disregarded issues of poverty, inequality, and social 
capital. The erosion of social capital (e.g. corruption) created 
an environment, which was not conducive to investment, 
economic growth and fiscal revenues (Stiglitz (2002:160-161)).
Fourthly, the core criticism of the IMF’s program was the 
repeated support for the overvalued fixed exchange rate policy 
and it never recommended the flotation of the ruble.   However, 
the IMF worried that the devaluation of the rouble would set 
off a round of inflation (see IMF(1998)). One view was that 
the rubble was overvalued, the result of an excessively tight 
monetary policy which was strangling Russian firms (Chapman, 
Mulino (2001:24)). Another view was that the rubble was at 
about its equilibrium value and that Russian firms would only 
be able to compete when they retooled. The current account 
was never in deficit because Russia was a victim of the 
Dutch disease, but that does imply overvaluation (Wyplosz, 
Halpern(1997:430-461), Ivanova and    Wyplosz (2000:23)). 
Hence, the July packet came under heavy discussion, 
especially the GKO-swap (Stiglitz (2002), Ivanova and Wyplosz 
(2001), Gurvich, Andryakov(2002)). This was exactly what the 
Mexican authorities did in 1994, a move fully recognized as 
deeply mistaken, possibly the main reason for the Mexican 
crisis a few weeks later (Wyplosz,Yudaeva (1998)).
In May 1998, speculators could see how much reserve was 
left, and as reserves dwindled, betting on devaluation became 
increasingly a one-way bet. They risked almost nothing betting 
on the rouble’s crash (Stiglitz(2002: 147)). After the impact of 
the Asian crisis, it was obvious that the IMF rescue had caused 
the multi-billion dollar gamble.  The IMF could not ignore the fact 
that its actions were technically wrong and practically hopeless. 
The most plausible answer is that the IMF acted under intense 
political pressure. When in late May 1998, President Yeltsin 
personally asked his Western counterparts (Clinton, Kohl and 
Blair) for emergency financial aid, President Clinton publicly 
promised his support for IMF and World Bank loans, but in the 
following G-7 finance ministers meeting in early June, did not 
make any firm commitment (Ivanova, Wyplosz (2000:31-32)).
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6. CONCLuSION
This paper investigated the events in Russia that led up to a 
currency crisis and debt default and the IMF policies intended 
to avert them. There are three generations of currency crises 
model. The first generation model said that the currency  crisis 
happened  due  to  inconsistencies  between  government 
policy (fiscal and monetary policy) and the exchange rate 
regime. To some extent, the moment of currency crisis can 
be predicted.  The second group of models prove that crisis 
can happen even if the macroeconomic fundamentals are 
correct. These models point to different reasons for the crisis 
like investors’ expectations of the future government policy 
(the second generation model) or the wrong microeconomic 
fundamentals (the third generation model).
 
As suggested in this paper, the hypothesis that Russia crisis 
was like a typical first generation model, the underlying 
vulnerability of the economy was a problem, which no  investor 
could possibly ignore.  In  order to  analysis this, CVW’s (1989) 
Argentinean monetary model of the balance –of-payments was 
adopted. In this model, agents observe the domestic credit 
policies of the authorities  and   forecast  future  domestic 
credit  policies  on   the   basis   of observations (Chapter 
4.3.1 eq. (12)). The model can provide each period with the 
degree of probability that in the next period the authorities will 
abandon the fixed exchange rate regime. Once this equation 
was obtained, the model was applied to the Russian fixed 
exchange rate from the end of 1995 to the end of 1998.  The 
empirical results were quite plausible. It was found that since 
1997, the domestic credit  growth  increase  had  gradually 
undermined  confidence  in  the  fixed exchange rate. 
Eventually, the cumulative point was at the end of 1998, when 
the collapse probability was above 90 percent, so this crisis 
could have been predicted by the theory.
These results focused attention on the IMF’s intervention in 
the context of this crisis. If the Russian episode reflected the 
so-called first generation model, the problem could have been 
solved only by deep changes in fiscal structure.  It could not have 
helped, in this situation, to add another tranche of international 
loans. These loans could only have postponed the time of 
the crisis by few weeks or months, which are exactly what, 
happened. In addition, it suggests that the fiscal and monetary 
reforms which were imposed in 1995 and earlier, were only 
so in appearance. The financing of the government deficit 
and public debt was not directly though the CBR, as in 1994, 
but through the banking system and financial foreign market 
(e.g. NDF contract). There were intense political concerns in 
the Russian situation that spread well beyond the economic 
and financial spheres. The July package, in particular, can 
be considered as a typically political decision. Certainly, the 
transition from communism to a market economy was not 
easy but extremely difficult if there was no strong domestic 
political support for the new reforms. In this context, the IMF 
policy in Russia was very difficult to carry out.
Abbreviations
IMF-International Monetary Fund
CBR-The Central Bank of the Russian Federation
IFS- IMF statistics (IFS- International Financial Statistics) 
EMS-European Monetatry System
CVW-Cumby and Van Wijnbergen (1989) GKO- government 
short –term bill
OFZ- long-term bond
Source IMF’s IFS
Appendix B – methodology
1. The money demand function (Md ):
Md = f ( y, i)
where y (the real income) and i (one or more nominal interest 
rates). I use the nominal interest rate because return on bonds 
(or deposits) is equal to   i - π where π - rate of inflation, i 
nominal interest rate on bonds (or on deposits), return of 
holding money is 0 - π so the total cost of  holding the money is 
–i. Money market is in the equilibrium then:
Ms / Qt  = Md
where Qt level of prices, Ms money supply. On the whole the 
long-run level of real money balances (demand for money 
model) is specified by two above equations. Furthermore log 
form was used in order to simplified the form and integration, 
to the extent the long-run money demand can be estimated in 
this manner
ln(Ms / Qt ) = β0 + β1 ln( yt ) + β 2  + nt
where yt  - real income and it- a short-term interest rate. The 
log form has been used except for the interest rate (semilog 
form) therefore is better approximation simply to use the level 
of the interest rate in an equation instead of the log of the 
rate. In additional in this model there is assumption about the 
full employment, so  that  I  neglected  the  output  in  the 
estimation  model.  Of  course  this assumption can be very 
strong, especially in the case of transition country like Russia. 
In order to estimate the long run demand for money I can use
mt − qt  = a − bit  + nt (1),
 
where all variables are in log expect for interest rate (small 
letter means log form of variables).
 
2. The theory of absolute purchasing power parity states 
that the   nominal exchange rate between  different currencies 
is equal the ratio of the  different countries’ price levels 
(et  = p*t / p t). This  equation is not result of unchangeable of 
real factor (for e.g. tastes, relative productivity, accumulated 
external net asset position, nation’s budget constraint) in long 
run equilibrium of  constant real exchange rate like relative 
PPP but this asserts that price levels are equalised across 
countries once they are converted in the same currency (This 
assumption is much more stronger). In this way the PPP theory 
indicates that a fall in a currency’s domestic purchasing power 
(level of domestic price will increase) will be connected with 
a proportional currency depreciation in the foreign exchange 
market. PPP thus asserts that all countries’ price level is 
equal when measured in terms of the same currency. A key 
ingredient in the logic behind absolute PPP is the law of one 
price ( Krugman and Obstfeld (2009:389-395), Burda and 
Wyplosz (1997:206-208).
3. High-powered money (monetary base, central bank money) 
is the sum of currency held by the non-bank public (currency 
in circulation) and bank reserve (commercial bank reserve: 
represents the fraction of deposits that commercial banks 
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July 1995 The autonomy of the Central Bank of Federation Russia.
1996 The capital liberalisation for non-residents.
Negotiations with the Paris and London Clubs for repayment of Soviet debt begin.
1997 Trade surplus moving toward balance. Inflation around 11 percent. Oil selling at $23/barrel. Analysts predict better credit 
ratings for Russia. Russian banks increase foreign liabilities. Real wages sagging. Only 40 percent of workforce being 
paid fully and on time. Public-sector deficit high.
September/
October 1997
Negotiations with Paris and London Clubs completed.
November, 
1997
Non-resident hold of GKO’s signed forward contracts with CBR in anticipation of a decision in the rubble following the 
Collapse of Asian crisis.Asian crisis causes a speculative attack on the rubble
November 11, 
1997
CBR defends the rubble, losing $6 billion
December 1997 Year ends with 0.8 percent growth
Prices of oil and nonferrous metal begin to drop.
February 1998 New tax code submitted to the Duma.
IMF funds requested.
March 23, 1998 Yelstin fires entire government and appoints Kiriyenko.
Continued requests for IMF funds.
April 1998 Another speculative attack on the rubble.
April 24, 1998. Duma finally confirms Kiriyenko’s appointment
Early May 1998 Dubinin warns government ministers of impending debt crisis, with reporters in the audience.
Kiriyenko calls the Russian government “quite poor.”
May 19, 1998 CBR increases lending rate from 30 percent to 50 percent and defends the rubble with $1 billion.
Mid May 1998 Lawrence Summers not granted audience with Kiriyenko. Oil prices continue to decrease.
May 23, 1998 IMF leaves Russia without agreement on austerity plan.
May 27, 1998 CBR increases the lending rate again to 150 percent.
Summer 1998 Russian government formulates and advertises anti-crisis plan.
July 20, 1998 IMF approves an emergency aid package (first disbursement to be $4.8 billion).
August 13, 
1998
Russian stock, bond, and currency markets weaken as a result of investor fears of devaluation; prices diminish.
August 17, 
1998
Russian government devalues the rubble, defaults on domestic debt, and declares a moratorium on payment to foreign 
creditors.
August 23-24, 
1998.
Kiriyenko is fired
September 2, 
1998
The rubble is floated.
December 1998 Year ends with a decrease in real output of 4.9 percent
Sources: Stiglitz (2002) , Shleifer and Treisman (2000), Desai, (2000), Chapman and Mulini (2001), Abbigail Chiodo and Owyang (2002), Ivanova and 
Wyplosz(2000), Sutale
(1999),  Małecki,  Sławiński, Piasecki and ?uławska (2001), Shleifer and Treisman (2000:100-149)), Sulimierska (2008b)
Appendix A-Case study 
Table 1.  The description of Russian economic and political situation  (July 1995 to December 1998)
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decide to hold as reserve) (see Gordon (1990:514), Burda and 
Wyplosz (1997: 219-220)
4. From eq. (8) and eq. (2) we obtain:4. From eq. (8) and eq. (2) we obtain: 
	  
	  
i* − i = P Ee f + (1 − P ) * e − e = P * (Ee f − e ) (9) t t t t t t t t t t 
5. This assumption, comes from Krugman (1978), Flood and 
Garber(1984)’s papers, is that the central bank will abandon 
fixed exchange rate when reserves fall zero. In addition 
Dornbush (1987) assumed some  positive critical level of 
reserve but Buiter (1986) and Obstfelt (1986) allowed to exist 
the negative net reserve due to the foreign lends. However, 
I decided to use the Dornbush’s assumption in modelling 
currency crisis in Russia. According to IFS Russian date 
(Appendix A Figure 1), almost all estimation period (June 
1995to October 1998) the foreign assets to exceed the foreign 
liabilities.
6. This model does not consider the aspect of game between 
the authorities and market agents (Obsfeld (1986), (1996), 
Eichengreen, Wyplosz and Rose(1997)) and problem of  the 
moral hazard and asymmetrical information in banking system 
(Krugman (1999), Aghion,Bachetta and Banarjee (2000, 
2001)).
7. From eq. (1), eq. (2) and eq.(4) we get:
t t t m  − e = a − b * [i* + Eet − et ] + nt (10). 
(10).
 
Then eq. (10) and eq.(9) will give:
* f 
Then eq. (10) and eq.(9) will give: 
	  
	  
	  
mt  − et  = a − b *[it 
	  
+ Pt  * Eet + (1 − Pt ) * et  − et ] + nt  = a − b[it + Pt   (Eet − et )]+ nt 
8.  In this model  xˆ means the value of some variables x 
given that a collapse has happened and given that the critical 
value for domestic credit growth is realised. Moreover, the 
date from balance sheet of Central Bank provide that foreign 
and domestic assets Rt + Dt have to be equal to Central Bank 
liabilities (High-powered money = Ct  + Dct where  Ct currency 
held by the non-bank public (currency in circulation),
Dct - bank reserve (commercial bank reserve). When gt increase 
so Dt ↑( from eq.(6)), than monetary base will increase, Central 
Bank, in order to allow not increase money in circle(in other 
worlds increase the pressure on exchange rate), will pull the 
domestic credit by decreasing the foreign reserve (e.g. open 
market transaction).
 
9. Et +1vt   = Evt is the expectation operator which base on the 
given information at the period t+1 ( on other words on the 
given information at the previous
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t +1 
� 
∑ t +1 
i 
∞ i ∞ 
∞ 
Because  ∑� b   �
 
� is the finite geometric series hence 
i =0 � 1 + b � 
∞   �  b   �
i 1   ∑� �  = 1   ∗ (b +1) = 1 1 + b i =0 � 1 + b 
� 
1 + b 
	  
and from assumption (1) nt  ~ N (0,σ n ) , thus we have: 
	  
	  
	  
Et +1eˆt +2   = 
1   ∑� b   �
 
� Et +1mˆ 
	  
	  
t +i+ 2 
	  
− a + bi*     − 1   ∑�   b 
i 
� � Et +1 
	  
nt +2+i 1 + b i =0 � 1 + b 
� 
1 + b i=0 � 1 + b 
� 
10. Eq.(16) was 
=     1 
∞   � b 
� 
i 
� 
� Et +1mˆ 
	  
	  
t +i +2 
	  
− a + bi * 
1 + b i=0 � 1 + b � 
corrected in eq.(22) (in Cumby and van Wiinbergen’ model, eq. 6 is corrected 
by eq.(8). 
	  
	  
* � *
 
Dt (1 + gˆ t +1 ) �
 
mˆ t +1  − et +1  = a − bit +1  − b * �− a + b ∗ it +1  + mˆ t +1  + b ∗ 
� 
	  
R + Dt (1 + gˆ t +1 ) 
∗ (λ ∗ g t  + (1 − λ ) ∗ gˆ t +1 )� � 
+ nt +1  − et +1  ⇔ 
	  
	  
* 2      �
 
	  
	  
Dt (1 + gˆ t +1 ) �
 
(1 + b)mˆ t +1  − (1 + b)et +1  = a(b + 1) − bit +1 (b + 1) − b 
	  
+ nt +1  ⇔ 
eq(22). 
* � 
� R + Dt (1 + gˆ t +1 ) 
∗ (λ ∗ g 
t  
+ (1 − λ ) ∗ gˆ 
t +1 )� 
� 
	  
12. According to Cumby and Van Wijnbergen’s model, the definition of variance 
was: 
	  
Var( y ) = E[( y − Ey)( y − Ey) = E( y 2 ) − [E( y )]2 . t t t t t 
	  
In   this   model,   the   variance  was   calculated: yt  = g t +1  − g t =υ t +1  − λ ∗υ t , 
Var(υ t ) = σ υ and E(υtυt +1 ) =0 
	  
	  
Hence, 
	  
Var( g 
	  
− g ) = E (υ 2 
	  
− 2λυ υ + λ2υ 2 ) − [E (υ − λυ )]2   = (E (υ 2 ) − [E(υ )]2 ) t +1 t t +1 t    t +1 t t +1 t t +1 t +1 
− λ2 ∗ (E (υ 2 ) − [E (υ )]2 )= (1 − λ2 ) ∗σ 2 t t υ 
13. Trapezoidal rule: b ( ) where
 
	  
	  
h  =  b −  a 
2 n 
∫ f ( x ) dx   =  h 
a 
y 
0    
+  2 y 
1   
+  2 y 
2    
+  ...  +  2 y 
n −  1   +   y n 
 
( Thomas and Finney (1985: 305-309). In the calculation 
program, it was used the file called the integrate Java written 
in Java to calculate value of integral form eq.(25) for each 
observation. Then I took all necessary parameters which I 
calculated from eq.(22) in STATA to Java program to compute 
the integral. In this program the numerical integration was done 
by the trapezoidal rule where h≈0.5 (ie. number of divisions 
and the exponential term calculated separately). After 
it, the whole valued of probability was calculated separately in 
Excel  where  the  results  from  the  Java  were  divided  by R 
L
t − R
U
t for  each observation.
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END NOTES
2The contagion and hedging effects is considered as the part of the second-
generation models instead of being the special category of third generation 
models such as financial market in efficiencies. In theoretical analysis is followed 
by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reihard (1997), Esquivel and Larrain (1998) and 
Sulimierska (2008 a,b).
3The twin banking-currency crisis model relies on the Diamond and Dybvig‘s 
dilemma (1983). There are two possible outcomes of the  market agents: first, 
agents have confidence in the solvency of financial intermediaries, and second 
there is a lack of confidence which leads to a run. Both equilibrium involve self-
fulfilling expectations because banks fail. The poor supervision of monetary 
authorities and the asymmetrical information problem results in financial 
markets being unable  to  efficiently  channel  funds  to  those  who  have  the 
most  productive  investment opportunities and therefore making them the crash 
of the banking system (see Mishkin (1996))
4The key issue is a mismatch of assets and liabilities: a country’s financial system 
is internationally illiquid if its potential short term obligations in foreign currency 
exceed the amount of foreign currency it can have access to on short notice 
(Change and Velasco (1998c)).
 
5To provide unambiguous evidence to support the theory on the causal links 
between currency and banking crises were provided in the following studies: 
Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999, Glick, Go and Hutchison (2006), Shehzad and De 
Haan (2008), Sulimierska (2008b).
6This overview neglects the empirical models of currency crisis which consider 
different aspect of another generation models: Puri, Kuan, and Maskooki (2001), 
Sachs, Velasco, Tornell (1996), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001), 
Kibritcioglu, Kose and Ugur (1999), Sulimierska(2008a,b).
7The majority of Soviet economy was thus promptly”privatized” by 
uncontrolled bosses whose sole allegiance had been to the Communist Party. 
The”connections”, a word synonymous with power and influence in the previous 
regimes, become a tool for private wealth accumulation. Most of the latter-day 
oligarchs started that way in these early hours of transformation. By late 1992, 
anti-market forces had regrouped around the Association of Industrialists. This 
association mobilized the managers of the huge Soviet – era conglomerates who 
used to be the regime’s backbone and beneficiaries. They were fighting back and 
trying to reverse the market-oriented measures introduced by reformers. With the 
active support of the Central Bank of Russia, they were the most dangerous force. 
Mass privatization shrewdly co-opted them: they were given for 51 percentages 
of the shares and the possibility of buying the rest. More precisely, the personnel 
were given 51 percentages of the shares, but the managers received a significant 
portion of it and easily convinced lower rank of employees to sell theirs at “nice 
price”. Once their wealth, until then only the notional present value of expected 
privileges, was transformed into effective ownership, their interest for a reveal 
of market reforms disappeared and Yeltsin’s power was consolidated. During 
1993 alone, leaving aside the oil and mineral extraction industries not yet up for 
sale, 40 percentage of Russian industry (measured in terms of employees) was 
privatized Stiglitz (2002:144-145), Ivanova and Wyplosz(2000:15-19)
8The World Bank was prepared to provide expanded assistance of $2 to $3 billion 
per year.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) continued to meet with Russian 
officials and provided aid. In September 1997, Russia was allowed to join the 
Paris Club of creditor nations after rescheduling the payment of over in old Soviet 
debt to other governments. Moreover, Russian government singed another 
agreement for debt repayment with the London Club. However, the improvement 
of international credit rating can be very questionable. For example, the Paris 
Club’s recognition of Russia as a creditor nation was based upon discussible 
qualifications. The one-fourth of the assets considered to belong to Russia was 
in the form of debt owed to the former Soviet Union by countries such as Cuba, 
Mongolia, and Vietnam. The recognition by the Paris Club was also based on the 
old, completely arbitrary official Soviet exchange rate of approximately 0.6 rubles 
to the dollar. The improved credit ratings Russia received from its Paris Club 
recognition were not based on an improved balance sheet ( Chiodo and Owyang 
(2002 :11), Stiglitz (2000:15-19)
9In 1997, 69 percentages of enterprises were private (including foreign 
ownership), 9 percentages had mixed ownership. True, there was a heavy price 
to pay: appalling corporate government. Most firms were in the incompetent and 
corrupt hands of the former”red barons” more apt at seeking subsidies than at 
retooling non-competitive businesses (Ivanova, and Wyplosz (2000:17-18)).
10It is a situation when a few large players dominated the capital market. The 
government has lack of a liquidity to withstand temporary deterioration of the 
external environment or a speculative attack.  The  key  point  is  the  moment 
when  the  crisis  hazard  with  the  private  sector.  The government forces 
investors to bail out government assets, the effect under consideration maybe 
important only in the most severe crisis cases.
11The root of the quadratic was chosen that is less than one in absolute value in 
order to insure stability of eq. (17).
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Appendix C Econometrics model
Table 1. The description of variables
Variables Definition
Exchange rate - et 
Source: IFS
Official exchange in rubbles per dollars at the end of month. Central Bank of Russia based on the Moscow 
Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX) rate. The post –January 1, 1998 rubble is equal to 1.000 of the pre-
January 1, 1998 rubbles.
Exchange rate - et
r 
Source: CRB
Official US dollar to rubble rate (rubbles per dollars) is set daily and enacted from the following calendar day 
at the end of month.
Foreign  assets  of  the  
central bank Rt - 
Source: IFS
Foreign assets and foreign liabilities comprise claims and liabilities in rubbles and other currencies: General 
government comprises central and local government units and their extra budgetary funds. This statistic is 
calculated as the sum of the foreign assets of Monetary Authorities and Deposit money banks minus the 
sum of foreign liabilities of Monetary Authorities and Deposit money banks. Foreign assets are dominated in 
domestic currency.
Foreign  assets  of  the  
central bank Rt 
t - 
Source: CBR
Foreign assets - balances on Bank of Russia’s and credit institutions’ accounts recording transactions 
made  with non- residents in foreign currency, the Russian currency and precious metals(balances on 
correspondent accounts, deposits and other  funds  placed  in  non-resident  banks,  credits  extended  to  
non-resident  banks,  non-resident  legal  entities  and individuals, debt liabilities, and bill acquired from 
foreign governments, banks and other non-residents, investment into foreign companies’ and banks’ shares 
of stock) as well as foreign currency cash in credit institutions’ vault.  Foreign assets are dominated in 
domestic currency.
M1 - mt
1 
Source: IFS
It measures the stock of narrow money, which comprises transferable deposits and currency outside deposit 
money banks and demand deposits other than those of the central government. This variable is in log form.
M1 -  mt
1 r 
Source: CBR
It measures the stock of narrow money, which comprises transferable deposits and currency outside deposit 
money banks and demand deposits other than those of the central government. This variable is in log form
M2 - mt
2 
Source: IFS*
It is the broader measure of money, is equal to M1 plus liabilities of these institution, which comprise time, 
saving and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than central government. This variable is in 
the log form
M2 -  mt
2 r 
Source: CBR
It is the broader measure of money, is equal to M1 plus liabilities of these institution, which comprise time, 
saving and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than central government. This variable is in 
the log form
Gross  Foreign Liabilities-R1t 
Source IFS
The sum of the foreign liabilities of Monetary Authorities and Deposit money banks
Gross  Foreign Liabilities- R lrt 
Source: IFS, CBR
The sum of the Monetary Authorities’ foreign liabilities and the foreign liabilities borrowing by banking 
sector from non-residents: balances on LIBOR accounts, credits contracted, deposits, and other funds 
denominated in foreign currency, in the Russian Federation currency, and precious metal as well as IMF 
loans extended to Minfin and the CBR.
Domestic Deposit Rates- it 
Source: IFS
This rate usually refers to rates offered to resident customers for demand, time, or saving deposits. 
Frequently, rates for time and saving deposits are classified according to maturity and amounts deposited; 
in additional, deposit money banks and similar deposit –taking institutions may offer short- and medium-
term instruments at specific amounts and maturities; these are frequently termed ’’ certificates of deposit’’. 
Prevailing rate for one-month time deposits in denominations of more than Rub 300,000. Beginning in 
January 1997, weighted average rate offered by commercial banks on time deposits of households in 
national currency with remaining maturity of up to one year. The rate id weighted by deposit amounts.
Domestic Deposit Rates- it 
r 
Source: CBR
Interest rates on resident credit institutions ‘funds attracted into the CBR’s deposit accounts using Reuters 
Dealing System, on standard terms determined by the CBR provision 67-P 13.01.1999. For 1995 and 1995 
deposit interest rate was a prevailing rate on the time deposit with monthly interest payment for amounts 
of RUR 300,000. But since 1997 up to now deposit rate is an average-weighted rate on deposits of private 
individuals in commercial banks (including Sberbank) for a term of up one year.
Foreign interest rate it* 
Source: IFS
United States one month Treasury Bill rate
Domestic Credits 
Source: IFS
The sums of the claims on central government,  the claims on State and Local Governments, the  Claims 
on Local government, the  Claims on Non-financial Public enterprises, the claims on the other financial 
institutions which is computed as the sum of Monetary Authorities’ claims and Deposit money banks’ claims
Notes: CBR-date Bulletin of Banking Statistics and Monetary Survey of Central Bank of Russia (www.cbr.ru), IFS-date for IMF statistics of International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) -Monetary Survey and Monetary authorities’ data, Monetary Survey- Monetary authorities’ data in IFS generally consolidate the accounts of 
the central bank with the accounts arising from the monetary functions undertaken by other institutions. These functions include the issuance of currency, 
the holding of international reserves, and the conducting of Fund account transactions. Monetary Authorities: consolidates the accounts of the Central Bank 
of Russia and monetary authority functions conducted by the central government. All date include both ruble- and foreign –currency denominated accounts. 
Date before June 1995  were compiled by the IMF using basic accounting data and other information provided by authorities prior to establish of regular data 
reporting.,  M1 and M2-approximation of money supply), domestic credits was an approximation of domestic assets.
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Table 2.The money demand  estimation.
Data sources Monetary Base Independent variable 1 Monthly 
Data IMF’s IFS 
M1Coefficient 
(p-value)
2Monthly Data 
CBRM1
3Monthly 
DataIMF’s 
IFSM2
4 Monthly Data 
CBR M2
Constant 10.43
(0.0493)
10.41
(0.052)
10.27
(0.047)
11.02
(0.057)
Domestic Interest rate -0.0032
(0.0009)
-0.0026
(0.0008)
-0.0024
(0.0009)
-0.0019
(0.0009)
σ  n 0.37 0.377 0.543 0.361
Test for autocorrelation Durbin-Watson d-statistics 
(2,103) Durbina’s alternative   test for autocorrelation 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook- Weisberg χ2 (1)
2.0075
2.627
2.611
0.061 2.031 0.86
Test for heteroscedasticity Breush-Pagan / Cook- 
Weisberg χ2 (1) White’s test χ2 (2)
4.62
0.0047
5.24
9.14
5.6
0.0177
5.01
7.39
Notes:  The  estimation  of  money  demand  was  estimated  eq.  (1) m t− q t = a − bi t + n t (1)    where
n t  ~ N ( 0 , σ n ) with assumption (4) that p t = e t. Hence, the estimation equation was m t − e t =  a − bi t + n t. The domestic interest rate it i t  was 
calculated as domestic deposit rates. For each column standard error are reported in brackets.
Data Source Monthly Data-IMF’s IFS
Independent variable Coefficient(p-value)
Lag of foreign interest rate 0.991 
(0.052)
Test for stationary Dicker-Fuller -2.58 critical value 5% -3.580
Test for autocorrelation Durbin-Watsond-statistics (2,103)
Durbina’s alternative test for autocorrelation Breusch-Pagan/ 
Cook-Weisberg χ2 (1)
2.13
2.627
2.611
Notes: The estimation of money demand was estimated eq. (3)
standard error are reported in brackets.
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Note:  Pt is estimated probability at the end of period t that the fixed exchange rate will be abandoned at the end of period t+1. 
( D t   − D 0 ) / D t  is the rate of domestic credit growth from the end of 1995 to end of period t. 
Note:  Pt is estimated probability at the end of period t that the fix d exchange rate will be abandoned at th end of period t+1. ( D t   − D 0 ) / D t  is the rate 
of domestic credit growth from the end of 1995 to end of period t.
Table 3. The foreign interest rate estimation
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1Wallace Jacob, Senior Assistant Professor, Tolani Maritime Institute, Pune, India.
Beyond doubt the world today consists of nations which have 
been fashioned by trade, immigration, emigration, wars (in a 
few cases), alliances and nexuses, crimes, problems, internet, 
ideologies, cinemas, whims and fancies of a few powerful men 
(and women) and serendipitous discoveries or inventions. 
Some of these benign or malignant or maligned or visible or 
invisible forces have been majestically captured and portrayed 
in the tome bearing the caption Pax Indica: India and the World 
of the 21st Century. The masterpiece under review is a reader’s 
delight because of its content which covers a relatively vast 
timeline, scholarly erudition and ornamental diction. It provides 
a mesmerizing and astounding view of the chronicles that 
led to the present state of a few of the major powers in Asia 
through eleven meticulously researched chapters. 
The first chapter offers Shashi Tharoor’s view of India’s foreign 
policy and the actions (seemingly bipolar) which our country has 
taken to build a strong foundation for the strategic autonomy 
of her denizens especially when different constituents of 
our country pursue varied interests. The chapter provides 
definitive details related to changes in literacy rate, child 
mortality and life expectancy, foreign direct investment, gross 
domestic product, exports over a period of time. The early part 
of the second chapter highlights the key differences in the 
governance of India and her well-armed neighbour Pakistan. 
The chapter provides a bird’s eye view of the Kashmir issue. 
It dissects the facts due to which India does not behave like 
Israel – a country which takes decisive action against those 
who try to leave scars on its soil or citizens – and a few other 
countries. The third chapter is devoted to a few core issues 
pertaining to  some of the nine countries with which India has 
close geographical proximity. The fourth chapter is a deep 
dissection of the curious cases of two growing economies 
of Asia and the new India-China equation. It delves into the 
complex and massive economic, military, civil transformations 
the two countries have undergone in the past few decades. At 
places this study appears to be partially skewed. At a personal 
level I feel that the reader of the book being reviewed should 
also read a book bearing the name Breakout Nations authored 
by Ruchir Sharma to gain a more balanced view of the ground 
realities and future projections. 
The early part of the fifth chapter extols the India-Arab relations, 
India-Palestine relations, India-Israel relations, India-Iran 
relations, India-Southeast Asia relations and interchanges. 
Perhaps the inclusion of a deep study of the ‘Arab Spring’ 
movement might have made this chapter more meaningful. The 
latter part of the chapter throws light on the existing conditions 
in the north-eastern part of our country as well as the linkages 
of the north-eastern states with Southeast Asia. The sixth 
chapter is an analysis of America’s approach to India from the 
time when India did not appear anywhere in America’s radar 
to the present time when America evinces keen interest in 
India. The seventh chapter provides a glimpse into the policies 
followed by Europe, Russia, Africa and Latin America which 
are emerging as new poles in this multipolar world. The eighth 
chapter is a treatise on India’s ‘soft power’, the reach, use and 
effect of social networking sites. The ninth chapter is devoted to 
Indian Foreign Service. It describes the recruitment, selection, 
training, requirements, orientation, deficiencies (which are 
being overcome), limitations, organizational culture of the 
elite service. The tenth chapter offers a scientific treatment to 
a question which has been haunting several people for many 
years. The eleventh chapter is an endeavour to make the 
reader realize the significance and utility of a foreign policy that 
is interlinked with national interests which have been defined 
in a concrete manner.
The author has built on the works of noted writers and 
scholars like Franz Kakfa, David Malone, Richard A. Falk – 
who has written a number of essays analyzing the legality of 
several military operations, Henry Kissinger – known for his 
groundbreaking book On China, Ashley Tellis – who specializes 
in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, 
Joseph Nye – who coined the term ‘soft power’. The tome 
under review can be helpful in gaining an understanding of the 
factors that have fashioned the present-day geopolitical and 
economic dimensions of several regimes.
The book contains startling facts. For instance, on Page 18 
the author of the book says that GE and Phillips employ more 
researchers in India than in their worldwide headquarters. 
Page 82 of the book contains a famous declaration made by 
a person occupying one of the highest seats in the fiefdoms of 
power which has been refuted by the author of the book. Pages 
121 and 122 bring out the fact that China and India account for 
nearly a tenth of global GDP, a fifth of world exports and a sixth 
of all international capital flows. Page 140 speaks about an 
occasion in which China had denied a visa to an officer of the 
Indian Air Force who was born in Pasighat, Arunachal Pradesh 
on the grounds that he was not entitled to an Indian passport or 
a Chinese visa. Page 276 declares that India’s army is already 
the world’s fourth largest army. The book contains information 
which is eye-opening, knowledge-enhancing, entertaining, and 
sometimes petrifying or disquieting. It lays bare the fact that 
different countries may offer radically different views on several 
pertinent and ailing issues, nonetheless the challenges which 
they are facing are similar, albeit the measures adopted for 
resolving the problems by a few nations are definitely better 
than the measures adopted by the other nations.
The book will be very helpful to the people who formulate 
policies on a national scale and the champions of strategic 
management, authority and power, international relations, 
international business, and to anyone who is interested in 
understanding the subtleties of the new world order. 
BOOK REVIEW
Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century [Shashi Tharoor (2012); Penguin 
Books, New Delhi]
Wallace Jacob1 
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